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Ihe ^president's letter
Julian C. McPheeters
The enrollment for the fall quarter at Asbury Theological Semenary is 318.
The peak enrollment for the previous year was 282. The student body comes
from 83 colleges and universities, 28 denominations, 41 states and seven foreign
coimtries.
A twenty-four hour vigil of prayer was observed during the week following
registration. Dr. Lela McConnell, President and founder of the Mount Carmel
School, in the mountains of Eastern Kentucky was the guest speaker at two of
the main public services. Dr. R. F. Ockerman, pastor of the Methodist Church
at Wilmore, spoke at one of the main public services.
One of the significant events of the year in the total Asbury program, is the
tall revival on the campus of Asbury College, in which the town of Wilmore and
the seminary participate with the college. Dr. John R. Church was the Evangelist
for the revival which was held in October. The revival proved to be another of
the great revivals in Asbury history. The long altar in the Hughes auditorium
was crowded with seekers night after night. Pentecost was manifest in reality.
For many years, the town of Wilmore and the two Asbury institutions have
periodically been confronted with a shortage of water. Asbury College owns the
water system and has supplied the town and the seminary with water. A great
supply, coming from wells, proved to be inadequate in times of drought. The
shortage of water proved to be quite serious on a number of occasions, even to
the point of threatening the closing of both institutions.
The water situation has at last been solved through the timely efforts of
Dr. Z. T. Johnson, President of Asbury College, and the Board of Trustees of
the College. A new water system, the latest in design and efficiency, supplied
with water from the Kentucky River, has been installed. The new water plant
was installed during the summer months and made ready by the opening of the
fall quarter, under the direct supervision of Dr. Z. T. Johnson. The town and the
seminary are deeply grateful to Dr. Johnson and the Board of Trustees of the
College for this splendid achievement. The new water system was installed at a
cost of approximately $150,000.
Five new students have been enrolled from other countries, one coming from
Norway, one from Korea, one from Japan, and two from India. We anticipate a
further increase in enrollment from other countries at the opening of the winter
quarter in January.
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A second phase of the new building program of the seminary was launched
at the June commencement. The new campaign is for the erection of the chapel
and the library building. The campaign was initiated with cash and pledges
totaling $195,000. The student body, since the initiation of the campaign, has
assumed an undertaking of $33,000. The goal for the new campaign is $600,000.
The leader for the Holiness Emphasis Week, November 8-11, was Bishop
C. V. Fairbaim. The annual ministers' conference will be held January 31-Feb-
ruary 2. The Lizzie H. Glide Lectures for the conference will be delivered by
Bishop J. Paul Taylor and Bishop Paul B. Kern.
The new staff members coming to the seminary this year, include : Susan B.
Schultz, A. B., M. S. in L. S., Librarian, Jack Howard Goodwin, A. B., M. S.
in L. S., Head Cataloger, A. Warnock, A. B., M. A., Assistant Cataloger, Beuhh
Bevins, A. B., Registrar, Barton Fletcher, A. B. Assistant in Music, and Robert
Fraley, A. B. Assistant to the President in the Field.
The days ahead hold an increasing challenge for the seminary. We request
the prayers of the readers of The Seminarian, that we may respond to this chal
lenge under the leadership of the Holy Spirit.
Notice to Subscribers
It assists the mailing staff of The Asbury Seminarian if
subscribers will report changes of address promptly.
Thank you
Go Preach!
James D. Robertson
Never in the history of preaching have
so many alluring by-paths of ministerial
service sought to draw the Christian
preacher from his task of preaching. It can
hardly be said that these have contributed
in any marked manner to the proverbial
decline of the pulpit in modern times.
Other factors in our day have been more
crippling to the usefulness of the pulpit,
not the least being the kind of content
values of sermons themselves. Happily
there seems to be a rediscovery of the cen
tral importance of preaching coming not
only from "the so-called practical men of
the church but from the theologians as
well." ' The frustration, however, being ex
perienced especially by young men facing
the bewildering variety of emphases in the
church's program is such that some re-ex
amination of the historic preaching cre
dentials seems expedient. This calls for a
brief excursion into familiar territory,
even at the risk of seeming tedious.
Just as the prophet is the most arresting
figure in the Old Testament so is the
preacher in the New Testament. That
preaching was central in the ministry of
our Lord is made amply clear in the Gospel
record. The first reference we have of
Jesus' ministry is, He ''came teaching the
Kingdom of God." At Nazareth He reveal
ed that His mission was "to prochim good
good tidings to the poor to proclaim
release to the captives to proclaim the
acceptable year of the Lord." His initial
charge to the Twelve at the beginning of
their ministry was, "Go preach" So also
His last words were a solemn injunction
to "preach the Gospel and make disciples
of all nations." It cannot be without signi-
^Kennedy, G., His Word Through Preaching,
p. 5.
ficance that Christ's commission to the dis
ciples places preaching first. The apostles
themselves were later to appoint deacons in
order that they might give them
selves wholly to the ministry of the
Word. Paul was eventually to write to the
Corinthian Christians that Christ sent him
"not to baptize but to preach the Gospel."
It was God's plan, he added, to save men
"by the foolishness of preaching" Each of
the New Testament words translated
"preacher" contributes its shade of mean
ing to the whole and each has to do with
the art of speech. The preacher is essential
ly a voice.
The Christian church was launched with
preaching. On the Day of Pentecost men
heard the Gospel, each in his own tongue;
and on that day Peter preached his great
est sermon. From the time of Augustine
and Chrysostom and Ambrose till the days
of Beecher and Spurgeon, the church's
greatest contribution to the world has been
her pulpit ministry. Such names as Savon
arola, Wycliffe, Huss, Luther, Calvin,
Knox, and Wesley are effective witness to
the value of preaching in bringing about
great moral and social reforms. In fact,
the spirit and life of the church and the
quality of preaching have advanced or de
clined together.*
It was never intended that the ministry
of the Word should be an adjunct to the
great work of saving men. As Professor
Farmer points out, preaching is "indis
pensably a part of the saving activity it
self." ' To insist, as some do, that preach
ing finds its inception and inspiration in
'Broadus, J. A., On the Preparation and De
livery of Sermons, pp. 2, 3.
'Farmer, H. H., The Servant of the Word,
p. 21.
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the psychological nature of man, i.e. man's
passion and compassion must find expres
sion in act-on, is a totally inadequate ex
planation of this unique calling. It is
enough to say that preaching had its be
ginning in the sovereign will of God, and
is the expression of the Divine compassion.
Farmer sees the distinctive nature of
preaching as "that divine, saving activity
in history, which began two thousand
years ago in the advent of Christ ... It is
God actually probing me, challenging my
will, calling on me for decision, offering
me His succour, through the only medium
which the nature of His purpose permits
His to use, the medium of a personal re
lationship. It is as though, to adapt the
Apostle's words, "God did beseech me by
you."*
It would be foolish to insist that preach
ing should monopolize a man's ministry.
Pastoral care is inseparably bound up with
the work of the pulpit. Yet it can never
be a substitute for pulpit power. Henry
Sloane Coffin once remarked that great
congregations are never built by ringing
door-bells. Bishop Gerald Kennedy writes,
"There is a saying that a house-going min
istry makes a church-going people. If that
was ever true, I do not believe it is today."*
In an age without hospitals, asylums, and
sanitaria, Christ's own ministry might well
have been monopolized by healing diseased
minds and bodies yet the emphatic note in
the Gospel is, Jesus came preaching.
Nor are the minister's obligations to be
ignored with respect to administration, re
ligious education, and worship. Each has
its lawful demand on the time and energy
of the man of God. The unwarranted em
phasis being given to some parts of the
Church's program is due partly to social
seminary specialist's fondness for his own
demands and partly, if inevitably, to the
familiar sphere. It is the singular stress
being given to these essential but subsidiary
parts that is the source of so much bewild
erment to the young preacher. Unless he
keeps his call to preach crystal-clear, all
too frequently he finds that numerous or
ganizational activities and institutional in
terests are dissipating his energies and
muzzling his prophetic voice. In conse
quence, on Sunday mornings the hungry
sheep look up and receive but slender fare.
In our day of specialization, when con
gregations lack that community of inter
ests which characterized the days of our
forefathers, only the messenger of God is
in a position to help men to see life steadily
and see it whole. Without his interpretation
of the Vision of God, men must become
something less than men.
There is no danger of the work of
preaching ever passing away although it
may suffer periods of decline and may
need to change its forms to meet new con
ditions. Its mission is perpetual in the mind
of God. It will remain the church's great
est potentiality for attracting men regard
less of times and seasons. Wherever a truly
great preacher appears he will draw the
people, irrespective of denominational lines.
If the church is to command the respect
she should, she must have men who above
all know God. "But she must have men
who shall hold preaching as the highest
and most difficult art, who shall not be
lazy or insincere, who shall bend them
selves to its attainment. " *
*Ibid., pp. 27-28.
'Kennedy, op. cit. p. 3. �Hoyt, A. S,, The Work &f Preaching, p. 19.
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Social Science Seeks Enlightenment
Samuel Richey Kamm
Our social sciences are seeking a new
orientation. For roughly three hundred
years the scholars in these fields of know
ledge have been pursuing the truth in the
intellectual squirrel cage of scientific
thought. It was Thomas Hobbes, that
wisp of a British mathematician, that
started social scientists on the road to in
tellectual and moral frustration. By his
emphasis upon the primacy of the hedon
istic iridividual and the method of rational
science he turned the intellectual world
upside down. From that time forth men
were to abandon the canons of thought
which rested upon faith in a sovereign
God and to substitute in their place a faith
in a sovereign universe.
The effects of this naturalistic orienta
tion were not immediately evident. Few men
saw the results of transferring the found
ations of their thought from the premises
of Augustine to those of Descartes and
Hobbes. Writers such as Locke lived in
the pattern of the strictest Puritan but
thought in the language of the urbane
pagan. What would happen when the
"salt" of the Christian assumptions had
lost its "savor" and only the sanctions
of the rationalized concept of past ex
perience remained? Only the excesses of
the late eighteenth century revolutions
and the disasters of the early twentieth
century holocausts could tell.
It may appear to some that this is a
far-fetched observation. Few students of
the social sciences realize that the basic
assumptions of any science of society are
consonant with the total culture of which
they are a part.* A hasty review of the
history of social thought reveals the fact
that the social science of the classical
'R. S. Lynd, Kndwledge for What? The Place
of Social Science in American Culture (Princeton
University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1939),
116
world was cast in the mold of the re
flective sciences of that cultural period.
Herodotus cannot be adequately under
stood apart from the work of Thales and
Heraclitus, nor can Thucydides be properly
appreciated unless studied in the light of
Hippocrates and Galen. Aristotle, also.
drew inspiration from these sources. The
Christian publicists leaned heavily upon
Plato's Timaeus as well as the cosmology
of the Hebrew Scriptures for their social
epistemology.*
The mediaeval world witnessed a grow
ing fission between a culture viewed within
the Christian framework of ideas and that
prehended through the scientific frame
work brought to life in the renaissance of
classical culture. Aquinas endeavored to
weld these conflicting orientations into
a universal synthesis which offered to cre
ate a new framework for the social thought
of the West. Marsiglio of Padua gave
warning in the fourteenth century that
the union could not be permanent. Luther
and Calvin strove to lead the Western
world back to thoroughly Christian pre
suppositions. But by the seventeenth cen
tury Hobbes had frankly renounced all
revelational elements in his framework
of thought and had launched boldly upon
an attempt to place social science within
the framework of the natural sciences of
the Greeks. In so doing he chose to divorce
social thought in the West from the great
presuppositions which had been the foun
dation for all social thinkers for over
a millenium.
Nature now became the deity of the
Western world. All of the creative attributes
of the God of the Hebrew-Christian
system were transferred to that hypostasis
of the natural universe known as Nature.
*C. N. Cochrane, Christianity and Classical
Culture (Oxford University Press, New York,
1944), 458-459, 469-471.
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The universe was presumed to be mech
anistic in operation, mathematical in com
position, and geometric in design. God
could be understood perfectly by under
standing Nature. Man could be identified
only as a part of Nature. Society was the
creation of man in harmony with the laws
of Nature. Hence, if one would know
society and the social life of man he must
erect a "social physics," that is, a science
of society based upon a study of the
"natural laws" of society.
The fruit of this endeavor is to be
found in the work of Comte, Marx and
Spencer in the nineteenth century. Two of
these men, Comte and Marx, deserve
special mention. The first is to be noted
for his popularization of positivism as
the method of science. In this system
scientific study was held to deal only with
the attributes of things revealed to the
senses through observation and classific
ation. The generalizations thus developed
were held to be scientific laws upon which
a science of society could be erected.
When once constructed this body of
science would grant prevision to men and
thus enable human leaders to plan public
policy with a greater degree of accuracy.
and efficiency. Comte was seeking for a
basis of ideological unity in the Western
world. He thought that he had found it in
the directly observable phenomena of
social life. These data, inductively per
ceived and classified, would be recogniz
able by all because a part of their ex
perience. Positive truth would then be the
ideological framework of Western culture.
Comte's importance as a scientific phil
osopher has long since been diminished by
the more mature observations of other
scholars. The fact that Comte discouraged
the use of microscopes and instruments
of precise measurement in scientific in
vestigation, because they brought to light
data not immediately discernable to the
layman and thereby upset his plan to use
only that data within the observation of all,
has thrown suspicion upon his character
as a scientist. When it is also known that
Comte repudiated many of his ideas con
cerning the validity of human reason and
scientific truth as set forth in Cours de
PhUosophie Positive (Paric, 1830-1842),
and that he boldly returned to the metaphy
sical basis of thinking in his System of
Positive Polity (1851-1854)) it is to be
recognized that Comte had serious mis
givings about the validity of his whole
system." Yet his early advocacy of a
science of society, which he first called
social physics and later (1838) sociology,
remains as part of our culture as well as
his insistence upon the inductive methods
of observation then employed in the
physical sciences as the only legitimate
approach to the study of social phenomena.
In fact, it can safely be affirmed that
Comte's vision of a social science that
would bring predictive control within the
hand of man is still the motivating spirit
of social scientists today. Gunnar Myrdal,
the noted Swedish social scientist, has re
cently declared :
The rationalism and moralism which is the
driving force behind social study is the
faith that institutions can be improved and
strengthened and that people are good enough to
live a happier life ... To find the practical
formulas for this never-ending reconstruction of
society is the supreme task of social science.
.... We have today in social science a greater
trust in the improvability of man and society
that we have ever had since the Enlightenment.*
The work of Karl Marx is still more
interesting as an example of the interaction
between the science of the nineteenth cen
tury and social theory. Marx is usally
associated with Hegel because of his use
of the dialectical mode in his treatment of
materialistic influences in the universe.
Hegel, it will be remembered, employed a
form of dialectical idealism; Marx shift
ed the emphasis to a dialectical mater
ialism. What is not often recognized in
Marx' insistence upon the primacy of
materialistic forces is his debt to classical
and modern science. Marx was a very
careful student of ancient philosophy. His
'System of Positive Polity (London, 1875-
1877), I, 341.
*Gunnar Myrdal, The American Dilemma
(Harper and Brothers, New York, 1944), II,
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doctoral dissertation at the University of
Jena was entitled, "The Difference be
tween the Democritean and Epicurean
Natural Philosophy/" His familiarity with
the Greek philosophers enabled him to
discover the original sources of Hegel's
dialectic in the dialectical materialism of
Heraclitus, He, therefore, repudiated the
idealistic application of Hegel for the
materialistic thesis of the original and in
so doing made Hegel appear as if stand
ing on his head.*
The presuppositions of Heraclitus had
been highly refined by the nineteenth cen
tury scientists. Early in the century Sadi
Carnot, (1796-1832) the brilliant French
physicist, had developed the principle
known as the second law of thermody
namics. A few years later Rudolf Clausius
(1822-1888) amplified this general priii-
ciple into a scientific theory by an elabor
ate series of tests and observations. His
idea that the molecules in electrolytes are
continUillly interqhang^ng atoms became
popularized as the Clausian theory of en
tropy. By the terms of this system the
whole universe was conceived as in the
process of continuous change. The static
view of the world as sustained by natural
law was thrown into the discard as no
longer tenable. With it went the whole
body of social theory which had been based
upon those presuppositions. A search for
dynamic or changing concepts followed.
Darwin seized upon the concept of eternal
struggle as the motivating factor for
change in the natural universe. His Origin
of Species which appeared in 1859 served
as an inspiration to Marx and aided him
in formulating a social theory built more
directly upon the Gausian base.*
These influences are directly observable
in Marx' insistence upon the principle of
"Chester Maxey, Political Philosophies (Mac-
millan. New York, 1938), 567; Isaiah Berlin, Karl
Marx (Oxford University Press, New York,
1948, second edition), 78.
"C. N. Cochrane, Christianity and Classical
Culture, fn423.
'Vernon Venable, Human Natures The
Marxian View (Alfred A. Knopf, New York,
1945), 14-15.
continuous change in human society and
his refusal to deal with men as individuals.*
Men were to be studied collectively. To do
otherwise was to view them as something
other than men. It was the collective ex
perience of men that formed the basis for
empirical study. Men thought and acted in
association with each other within the
framework of a material universe anala-
gous to that within which the atom or
molecule existed. Men were subject to the
same material forces, impersonal in nature
and therefore subject to empirical obser
vation and classification. The "dialectic"
of human life in society was not looked
upon as cause in the ontological sense. It
was, says Vernon, "the formal structure of
material processes whose particular con
tent, direction and tempo can be determin
ed only by empirical examination."*
Engels expressed the Marxian view
very clearly when he wrote in his Ludwig
Feuerbach: "...the conflict of innumerable
individual wills and individual actions in
the domain of history produces a state of
affairs entirely analogous to that in the real
of unconscious nature. The ends of the
actions are intended, but the results which
actually follow from these actions are not
intended. . . Historical events thus appear
on the whole to be likewise governed by
chance. But where on the surface accident
holds sway, there actually it is always gov
erned by inner, hidden laws and it is only
a matter of discovering these laws.""
The importance of the Marxian in
fluence upon social theory cannot be mini
mized. Its professed adherence to the
canons of physical science has won for it
a place in Western culture out of all pro
portion to its validity as a scientific system
of thought." Indeed, it has passed from
the realm of science to the realm of faith.
Appearing now in the gospel of Com
munism it threatens to enthral the entire
*Vernon Venable, op. cit., 13-14
'lUd., 173.
"Cited in Robert P. Casey, Religion in Russia,
(Harper and Brothers, New York, 1946) 73-74.
"Pitirim Sorokin, Contempdrary Sociological
Theories, (Harper and Brothers, New York
1928) 527-546.
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Eastern and Western world." And all of
this in spite of the fact that both history
and science have raised questions as to the
validity of its predictions. History has de
monstrated that the class struggle does not
always result in the destruction of the en
trepreneur and the elevation of the
proletariat. Science has concluded since the
announcement of the principle of indeter-
minancy by Heisenberg in 1927 that pre
diction is indeterminate in character for the
atomic universe. Planck's more and recent
discovery that natural forces are not con
tinuous tends to throw doubt upon the
whole concept of a teleological dialectic. In
a word, scientific theory has deserted the
Marxian hypothesis, leaving his social
theory bereft of its entire system of con
structs.
The fate of Marxian social theory is the
fate of all social theory which is tied to the
epistemology of the physical sciences. The
whole concept of uniformity in the natural
world, which formed the basic pre
supposition for order and law in the social
world, is now swept away. The idea of law
derived through empirical observation is
now admitted to be at best a statistical
average." Scientific prediction has moved
from the realm of the absolute to that of
the relative or probable. In effect, all that
we may assert to be scientific truth in the
social realm is verified historical ex
perience. We can never claim imiversally
predictable validity for our hypotheses in
the realm of social science any more than
we can claim such for the field of the
physical sciences.
A number of social scientists are today
calling for a reorientation of this field of
inquiry. Gunnar Myrdal in his recent study
of the Negro in America challenges stu
dent of society to clarify their position as
scientific investigators and interpreters. He
lays particular stress upon the importance
" Cesar Barja, "The Outlook for European
Culture in The Outlook for Postwar Europe
(University of California Press, Berkeley, Cali
fornia, 1945), 84-85.
"A. S. Eddington, The Nature of the Physi
cal World, (Macmillan, New York, 1928) 98.
of recognizing certain a priori assumptions
in one's work (a position that has been
bitterly contested by all of the followers of
Comte and Dewey), and the necessity of
clarifying and defining the terms and con
cepts used in research. He makes bold to
assert that social scientists are dealing with
thinking human beings and that the pre
vailing climate of opinion is an important
scientific datum in analyzing hmnan be
havior." Robert M. Maclver of Columbia
University has coined the phrase "dynamic
assessment" to focus attention upon the
fact that men make decisions leading to
action within a framework of environ
mental influences which included not only
the social and technological order but the
cultural order which embiaces the realm of
ideas in traditions, faith and philosophies."
Others such as Robert S. Lynd of Middle-
town fame are in revolt against the en
slavement of the social sciences to the
empirical method of the physical sciences.
He believes that the method leads to the
arbitrary exclusion of pertinent data from
the field of observation."
A few of our modern social scientists
have made bold to adopt a new viewpoint
for the study of man. Pitrim Sorokin of
Harvard University has frankly rejected
the limited universal of the natural science
approach. He has endeavored to recognize
within the existing culture various orders
of truth including that of religious faith.
By so doing he has again admitted to the
scope of scientific consciousness the reality
of spiritual power which transcends that
of either the mind or the senses. He en
deavors to interpret culture in reference
to norms that are "given" and not
empirically derived from a set of circum
stances. For Sorokin the motion of men in
society is not that of mechanical regularity,
but one of fluctuation. There is no move
ment of linear or cyclical progress as long
advocated by adherents to the various
''An American Dilemma, II, Appendix 2, pp.
1032-1057.
^Social Causati&n, (Ginn and Company, New
York, 1942), 271-274.
'"Kn&wledge for What? 123-125.
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scientific traditions."
Arnold Toynbee, the English historian,
has employed a similar orientation in his
prodigious study of twenty-six civilizations.
For Toynbee the pattern of motion in
societies is one of challenge and response
both to the physical and social environ
ment and to the problems involved in
successfully conducting the civilization pro
duced." He denies the organic character of
civilizations, which is an attempt to identify
the life of men with that of biological
organisms, and substitutes therefor a set
of relations existing between living men in
a given society at a particular moment in
history. By accepting the world view of
Augustine and the early Christian publicists
"Hans Speier, "The Sociological Ideas of
Pitirim Alexandrovitch Sorokin. 'Integralist'
Sociology" in H. E. Barnes, ef al. An Intro
duction to the History of Sociology, 884-900.
"Arnold J. Toynbee, Civilisation on Trial
(Oxford University Press, New York, 1948),
3-15.
he projects his findings against a back
ground which views God as an active agent
in the universe.'*
This break with naturalistic presup
positions in the social sciences is one of the
most challenging developments in our day."
It opens the way for a reconsideration of
the problems of our time in the light of the
Christian revelation. Within the scope of
these newer approaches to the problems of
man the Christian doctrines of sin and
redemption have real meaning. They open
the door in a new way to the application of
the Gospel to the amelioration of himian
problems in our time.
"'H. E. Barnes, op cit., 717-736; Time, March
17, 1947, 71-79.
'"See Kenneth Scott Latourette, "The Christ
ian Understanding of History," American His
torical Review, LIV : 259-276, for a recent pre
sentation of the Christian view of history as the
working framework ot one of America's most
distinguished historians.
Modern Science And Values
Carl F. H. Henry
There is a very efficient device for
bruising the intimate feelings of a scient
ist. If one were to advise him that science
is a valueless pursuit, and that his labor-
ratory techniques are good for nothing,
the scientist would be quickly propelled
out of that state of depersonalized object
ivity which he so prizes in experimentation.
The reason for so spirited a reaction
is plain enough. About the value of science
the scientist has no doubt at all, however
indifferent he may be to the broader ques
tion of objective values. He will not yield
to the notion that the scientific endeavor
is without worth. In an atomic age the
one valuable thing, he may even think, is
the pursuit of scientific inquiry; whether
there are eternal and unchangeable moral
norms or values may be a matter for
cloistered dispute, but the value of science
is indisputable.
And yet it was precisly modern science
which at the beginning of our generation
insisted in uncompromised terms that it
has no dealings with an eternal, unchang
ing moral and spiritual order. Almost all
standard scientific works were marked,
as a characteristic feature, by the absence
of reference to values or ends for the sake
of which reality exists or ought to exist.
They assumed either that no such realm
of purpose and value exists, or that,
if
it does, the scientist knows nothing about
it. One could gaze through a microscope
into Herbert Spencei's tightly-printed
books, but he would search in vain for
interactions with the sphere of the good
and of the holy. The adaptations, cohesions
and integrations which interested Spencer
were not of a moral and spiritual kind.
Julian Huxley exlpressed the dominant
mood pithily when he wrote that science
is "morally and emotionally neutral" (in
Science and Religion, p 18).
But no scientist has a right to assume
the value of science unless he becomes
explicit about the science of values. Huxley
merely begged the question when he re
marked that "the only value which it
(science) recognizes is that of truth and
knowledge" (ibid., p. 18) For during mil
itary combat the science of censorship
has demonstrated that truth may often
be less valuable than falsehood, and the
value of knowledge can hardly be de
monstrated within the limited scope of
empirical tentativity, with its constant de
mand for revising all conclusions. The
value of science depends upon the science
of values. If there is no objective good then
science is not objectively good for any
thing. If there are no abiding values, then
science has no abiding value. If good and
evil are artificial or tentative distinctions,
then whenever men declare that science is
"good for" something they may equally
well assert it to be "bad for" the same
thing. Science is a valueless and worthless
endeavor if it operates in a sphere in
which value and worth are without a
home. We must either admit values, and
talk of science, or debar values, and cease
to assume the value of science.
The scientist has an immediate retort
to this kind of argument. Science can
have value and can be good for much,
he contends, without any necessary com
mitment to an eternal and abiding moral
and spiritual realm. The real value of
science, he says, is that it helps us to
make an effective adjustment.
It should be noted that the scientist
has no right at this point to any qualify
ing adjective suggestive of ethical dis
tinctions ; he must not, that is, speak of
a better or higher or proper adjustment,
because these all imply a scale of values.
But then, why is it good that we be aided
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in making an effective adjustment? If the
evolutionary process really moves on
from simple to increasingly complex forms,
why may it not involve the production of
a supra-human species, destined to sur
pass man as man has surpassed the amoe
ba? What is the good of an adjustment in
the interest of longevity? Or, what do we
want to live longer for? Or, if the most
effective adjustment in the interest of
Soviet perpetuity should involve our sud
den demolition, does not such an applic
ation of science fulfill the value of facil
itating human adjustment?
Sometimes it is assumed that, rather
than eternal and changeless values, all
that is necessary for an ethical civiliz
ation is a continuity of meaning for a
generation at a time. The false optimism
which underlies this sort of thought is
easily unmasked. When does the gener
ation begin and where does it end? Us
ually it is assumed by such theorists that
the generation of which they speak be
gins with their birthdate and ends with
their demise�a convenient personal mode
of dating to the neat chronology of which
the prevailing ideologies do not readily
accommodate themselves. It remains that
if what is good today may become evil to
morrow the door is ajar to the ethical
relativism which openly declares that might
is right. No ideology which makes value
to mean simply what is most pleasant
or most powerful, i. e., effective, can pro
test against naturalistic power politics.
The problem of values has been pro
pelled into the laboratories of modern
scientists by the international events of
our times. It is crystal clear now that
science can be combined with a natur
alistic as well as an idealistic or a theistic
outlook on life, and that atomic energy can
be employed to make men slaves or to
make them free. On the one hand, we are
told by supernaturalists that national fit
ness to survive is in terms of values in
tegral to Christian culture, in contrast
with the older civilizations of China, India
and the Middle East, or of the new
civilization of the Soviet. P. A. Sorokin
warns us that ethical relativism has reach
ed its maximum in our times, and that the
reduction of value to individual fancy is
a sign of "mental and moral anarchy"
which, if not halted, can lead only to "com
plete disintegration or mummification." On
the other hand, naturalists like Harry
Elmer Barnes condemn supernaturalistic
ethics, equating its chief interest with a
puritanical sex life and an auspicious
entry into the hereafter. The moral code
necessary for survival, Barnes contends,
must be founded not upon religion and
revelation, but upon the natural and social
sciences.
Here, clearly, are two vastly different
views. In the one case, values are assumed
to be eternal and unchanging; the good
is not something made in Japan, nor Rus
sia, nor even in the United States. In the
other case, it is assumed that no super
natural realm exists, but that values are
simply ideals, subject to revision, project
ed by man in his continuing effort to
master his environment.
Modern science has vacillated between
these alternatives. Nineteenth and twen
tieth century science exhibit a most re
markable contrast in their respective at
titudes toward the objectity of values.
Nineteenth century physics, except in
its higher agnostic moments, was com
mitted to a view of the universe which
assigned to moral, aesthetic and religious
values only a subjective status, to a view
which denied an objectively real moral
and religious consciousness as illusory.
The reason advanced by nineteenth cen
tury physics for this attitude is well known
even to vast mulitudes not skilled in the
subtleties of philosophy. To be real, as
serted the physics of two generations ago.
an object had to be visible and tangible ; all
else belonged to the realm of phantasy and
goblin, or was at best a matter of faith
without a knowledge basis. The content of
knowledge was limited to the data of sen
sation. The only reality known to science,
we were told, is phenomenal, and is subject
to mechanical causation which tolerates no
exceptions ; all else- -God, moral norms, the
inner sense of moral or religious obligation
- - belongs to the mythological or postu-
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lational, as the spiritual was rebaptised by
contemporary naturalism. Physics was
wedded to the naturaHstic bias with all the
authority that many influential scientists
could muster. The impression was carried
in academic centers that one had to take his
choice either be scientifiic or religious,
but not both�until the cleavage between
religion and science had been made all but
absolute.
The case for that sort of a imiverse, in
which any God, or any soul, or any moral
norm, had to have a subjective reality, was
never proved by nineteenth century physics,
else more recent thought would not have
found it so repugnant. The science of the
end of the century had not demonstrated
that the spiritual is unreal, any more than
it proved that reality must be seeable and
touchable; it had no method for dealing
with any reahties other than the natural,
and consequently was incompetent to de
liver a judgment with regard to them. The
physics of the day assumed - under the
sway of phenomenalism - that reality
must be sensate, and in consequence of this
assumption, it denied the reality of the
spiritual and moral.
Revolutionary changes in thought have
carried contemporary science a long dis
tance from that mechanical, block-t)rpe
universe of the nineteenth century. Today
physicists on every hand insist that the
most real things are invisible. The space-
time universe has undergone transsub-
stantiation. The real world is not, we are
told, the familiar world of persons and
places, neither the chairs on which we sit,
nor the floor on which we stand, nor the
things we see and touch. Rather, the real
world is invisible, a world of atoms and
electrons eluding the human eye, and not
subject to that strict mechanical causal
uniformity upon which the physics of the
past generation insisted. The nature of the
real world is not visible and touchable ; the
visible and touchable are not as ultimately
real as the invisible and untouchable. The
real world is permeated not with strict
causal continuity, but - as far as we know
it, at least - with a liberal discontinuity.
Since there is an objectively real world
which is invisible, twentieth century physics
does not arbitrarily rule out the possibility
of an ultimate moral and spiritual order;
neither God, nor values, nor the dictates of
the religious and ethical consciousness need
be explained away as illusory. So we hear
much of the new tolerance of science for
religion and morahty.
In fact, philosophical physicists like Sir
Arthur Eddington and Sir James Jeans
assert that the universe known to twentieth
century physics finds its best explanation
in the view that reality is the thought of a
divine Mind. They emphasize that the
scientific method does not reach far enough
to rule upon this issue; no thinker can say,
as a scientist, that there is no objective
moral and spiritual order, for his methodo
logy is too limited to make a pronotmce-
ment in this realm. Since the scientific
method carries us not to reality, but only
to that point from which the ultimate, in
visible reality is inferred, these scientists
hold that the correct inference is to an ob
jective Mind, rather than to mere non-
mental events, or to the mechanical block
universe of a half -century ago. The in
visible real world, they contend, is not
merely a scheme of symbols connected by
mathematical formulae, but rather, is a
mathematical Thinker.
It would be short-sighted indeed to re
gard men like Eddington and Jeans as
essentially in the Christian tradition be
cause of their proclamations here. For,
since the scientific method does not reach
to ultimate reality, these scholars do not
speak as scientists when they declare for
an ultimate Mind, any more than other
scientists speak as scientists when they de
clare against theism in favor of naturalism.
The very point of departure is the con
fession of the inability of the scientific
method to pronounce on the issue of theism
and of objective morality. Just because a
scientist turns metaphysician, there is no
reason for assigning to his works a vene
ration greater than that due the works of a
metaphysic alert to scientific discoveries.
Scientists have sometimes declared for an
objective spiritual and moral order in a
profoundly non-Christian sense, and that
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in the very name of Christianity. The new
emphasis that matter and spirit may not be
as foreign to each other as once thought,
should not obscure the Christian conviction
that the being of the universe is not the
being of God, any more than the inde
terminacy of the atom should obscure the
Biblical doctrine of the particular provi
dence of God. That a man is a specialist in
science does not give him any special
qualification for pronouncing on the nature
of ultimate reality. He displays the true
scientific spirit when he emphasizes that
his methodology cannot possibly settle the
issue one way or the other, not when, in the
name of science, he comes out for or
against an objective moral or spiritual or
der. The issue is not determined by the
scientific method, and the consequences
must be applied in both directions. The
declarations of Eddington and Jeans in
the interest of an idealistic interpretation of
the universe, insisting that the proper in
ference from the data of science is to a
creative Mind and not simply to an ob
jective mathematical order, are not to be
worshipped because they come from
physicists, for they are among the first to
remind us that physics is impotent to
determine the question. The merit of their
insistence upon a supreme creative Mind
and upon the objectivity of values turns on
other factors, and on these factors
scientists have no monopoly. Indeed, if
anything, science in recent generations has
disclosed a poverty of interest in the crucial
and relevant facts which are determinative
in this regard.
Within the restrictions of modem
science, the scientist cannot say that there
is an objective moral and spiritual order;
he can say only that he cannot declare that
these are merely subjective. That is not to
say that the scientist needs to be, nor that
he should be, agnostic about spiritual
verities. The testimony of scientists to the
objectivity of values is not important be
cause they are scientists, but because they
combine intelligent thought about the
super-scientific world with intelligent
thought about the scientific. When a scien
tist declares for an objectively real super
natural order, he provides evidence that a
scientist who scores one hundred in physics
need not on that account score zero in
metaphysics.
Curiously, while indoctrinating the
academic world in the unrivaled effective
ness of scientific methodology to deliver us
from mythology and superstition, much of
the science of yesterday placed itself at the
service-erroneously, as admitted today-of
a most specious sort of mythology. By
converting its methodology into a meta
physics, it ended up with a block universe
without any possibility of an objective
moral and spiritual order. That was a
ficitious world, even if proffered in the
name of science. A methodology which re
quires the a priori dismissal of God as
only a projection of fancy, and of all
ethical codes as the mere voice of tradition,
discloses more about its own limitations,
than it does about the nature of religion
and morality.
Contemporary thought is coming now
to see that because Bertrand Russell is a
genius in the realm of mathematics, he has
no right to reduce sex to sheer mathe
matical rhythm, that because Robert
Millikan is an illustrious physicist, his view
of human nature need not be considered
profoimd when he declares that war has
survived simply because it has survival
value; that because Albert Einstein is a
briUiant physicist, he is not on that accoimt
an authority when he declares that ethical
behavior requires no support from religion.
The great turning point in modem
scientific attitudes is the recognition that
the scientific method does not afford us
the exclusive access to tmth. The great
ages of philosophy entertained hardly a
doubt about the serious limitations of a
sensory methodology. The classic Greek
outlook, the medieval world view, and the
rationalistic philosophers from Descartes
to Hegel were agreed that, were know
ledge a product of sensation alone, the
whole quest for truth must be abandoned.
Even the early modern empirical philos
ophers, Locke and Berkeley, believed in
much more than they saw. But nineteenth
century physics held that the scientific
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method provided the sole avenue to truth,
and by so doing reduced reality in intent
to the world of nature. The upheaval due
to the newer physics is so remarkable, in
contrast with the naturalism of two gene
rations ago, that C. E. M. Joad does not
hesitate to declare that "so far an English
and American scientists are concerned, the
leaders seem almost unanimously to disown
any exclusive claim on the part of science
to give us information about the nature of
reality"
*
If the scientific method then gives us
but an abstracted view of reality, so that
by necessity it does not deal with such
realities as God and the moral order, the
question arises, why a paper on "Modern
Science and Values"? The reply is simple.
This is a gathering, in the main, of scien
tists, and it is one thing to hold that the
scientific method has proper limitations,
and another thing to say that a scientist is
a man who limits himself so as to have
nothing to do with deity and morality.
*
Precisely at this juncture the science of
yesterday contributed disastrously to the
moral paralysis of our times. It was not
from the scientist of that day that we got
much hint of the reality of the super
natural ; it was not from the scientist that
we got much encouragement for the belief
in the objectivity of values; it was not by
the scientist that we were taught that man
is essentially more than an animal. Whether
the scientist's silence was due to unbelief,
or due to the inabihty of his restricted
methodology to deal with these issues, did
not affect the general outcome, which was
the impression that a man who specializes
in scientific things has to be indifferent to
religion and morality. The scientific mood
seemed to be that, simply because he con
centrates within an abstracted method, the
scientist has to cut himself off in his
thought and life and pronouncement from
'Philosophical Asp\ects of Modern Science
p. 189.
'This paper was delivered at the fourth an
nual convention of the American Scientific Af
filiation in Los Angeles, California, August 25,
1949.
anything outside that method and by so
doing, the scientist of recent generations
nourished the false dogma that the scien
tific method is the avenue to truth, and
that the world of nature is the ultimate
real. The undisputed fact that major dis
coveries are made by the scientific method
came to mean, in such an atmosphere, that
nothing significant is to be learned by di
vine revelation. That the scientific method
was agnostic about values came to imply
that the scientist must be, at most, agnostic
about them.
Because of this failure to insist upon the
objective reality of a spiritual and moral
order, the average scientist has become
one of the most curious figures of the mid-
twentieth century. Indicating by his per
sonal example that a truly scientific atti-
ttide involves silence about spiritual and
moral realities, the scientist, confronted in
an atom bomb age by world peril due to the
"might is right" relativism of the Soviet,
suddenly pleads for an alertness to the
moral implications of scientific discoveries.
Yet, in company with other influences, it
was scientism that discouraged alertness
to an objective morality; it was scientism
which encouraged indifference to religion
and ethics, by a preoccupation with the
world of nature, to which man was absorb
ed. This engrossment with nature helped
to substitute a false means of salvation
for the salvation which the prophets and
apostles and Jesus Christ proclaimed. The
deepest reason for the modern man's hope
became evolution, or scientific method
ology, or some other alternative to Biblical
redemption. In contrast to the Scriptural
ideal of man's dominion over nature, im
possible of proper actualization apart from
the redemptive work of God, modern
science held forth the ideal of a conquest
of nature without any reference to man's
rnoral and spiritual regeneration. Thus it
obscured ends in the quest for means.
There was no intention of glorifying God
in the pagan subduction of nature. Where
the New Testament has asserted that "we
see not yet all things in subjection to man
. . .but we see Jesus," the scientific texts
emphasized only what can be seen through
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microscopes and telescopes, or rather, the
inference from such data, and often quite
fallacious inferences at that. Spiritual and
moral factors were lost in the search for
quantitative techniques. Modem science
came to espouse a false soteriology and
thus widened the gulf between the twen
tieth century and Biblical Christianity. The
divorce from the Hebrew-Christian revel
ation hastened the modern descent to rel
ativity in morals. The whole naturalistic
movement from the Renaissance to our
times has issued in a naturalistic ethics
which has been the undermining of all
ethics.
The challenge to the contemporary
scientist is that he declares, as unequivoc
ally as he proclaims the relevance of the
scientific method, the relevance of some
super-scientific method, and that he con
sider himself under a supreme obligation
to pursue super-scientific truth as devot
edly as he pursues restricted scientific
truth.* No accumulation of ethical seminars
by distinguished scientists touches the prob
lem, while the rupture with the sufficiency
of scientific method is half-hearted. Atomic
physics may refine sense perception,
teaching us that reality is uncritically man
ifested to sensation, but it is no wedge
at all for the admission of value areas
which cannot be manifested�even un
critically�in the stuff with which labor
atories deal; the reality of values turns
on the acknowledgment of a method com
petent to deal with them. The open-mind-
edness which cheerfully grants that the
scientific method cannot rule out the pos
sibility of God and eternal values, might
as significantly grant the possibility of
transparent ghost writers and two-headed
snarks on the other side of Mars. Open-
*If the objects of theological and philosophical
study are genuine, there is no compunction to
limit the term "scientific method" to sensation-
alistic inductionism. The widening of objective
reality involves the widening also of scientific
methodology. From this viewpoint, it is quite
unscientific arbitrarily to restrict the term to
a small segment of reality which, as a whole,
can be systematically explored. But the term is
used here in its recent limited sense, by way of
accommodation.
mindedness on such issues means nothing,
while there is no clear cut statement of
the right of another method to deal with
the spiritual and moral aspects of reality.
No plea merely for the priority of the
social sciences over the physical sciences
is adequate, for social psychology, econ
omics and sociology can be used for evil as
well as for good ends. What we need is
a method which deals with ends, with val
ues, with an ought. If there is no such
method, then scientific angosticism is the
last word. If there is, then to stop with
scientific agnosticism is a crime against
humanity, for the wortli of man turns upon
the validity of certain values quite apart
from subjective preference and opinion.
The scientific method, as the moderns
define it, is not a method to deal with
the ought; it is an abstracted device for
dealing with the is, and, indeed, for deal
ing only with the phenomenal is. Great tra
ditions in world thought prior to modem
sensationalism considered it a tragic mis
take to think only of a science of phe
nomenal realities. They spoke of the sci
ence of nature; they recognized the exis
tence of normative, no less than of descrip
tive sciences. No merely descriptive obser
vation of nature and man will ever carry
one beyond the is to the ought. Therefore
the scientist who pleads for a renewed in
terest in morality, but who remains in
bondage to scientism, will never get be
yond the affirmation that a certain course
of action is preferable because it is most
pleasant or because it appears to work.
He will never rise to the requirement of a
true morality, with its insistence that the
good must be done because it is object
ively good.
It is not insisted that the scientist must,
in the midst of every scientific investi
gation, raise the question of ultimate val
ues�as though he has no right to peer
through his telescope until he has exhaust
ed the ethical implications of the par
ticular experiment. An obstetrician charg
ed with delivery of an infant would hard
ly be forgiven for interrupting his duties
to write a volume on vicarious suffering.
But to convert this necessity for scientific
MODERN SCIENCE AND VALUES 97
diligence into a total indifference to values
is quite another thing.
Nor, because we insist upon ultimates
which are beyond change and flux, and
upon which the whole scientific endeavor
finally rests if it is to make sense, are we
to be charged with complete abandonment
of any realm of probability and revision.
That there is a realm of technics, which
is most competent to deal by direct ex
amination and research with certain areas
of reality, reaching conclusions which are
subject to constant empirical revision, is
not at all beyond dispute, as long as the
interpretations yielded by such a method
are clearly labeled as partial explanations,
abstracted for specific uses, and not deal
ing with the question of purpose, nor
minimizing that the why is in the long run
of greater significance than the what.
Science affords us a view of things
which is only partially coherent, and
which therefore reaches beyond itself for
intelligibility. This is true not only of the
conclusions of science, but also of the
very premises with which it sets out. As
to the conclusions, it is a frustrating and
self-defeating statement of human nature,
and one which can issue only in pessimism,
which fixes upon man as a speck of an
imated stellar dust and leaves suspended
in mid-air his deepest hopes and fears in
volving a relationship to a real but un
seen spiritual order; science does not make
room for the scientist, in his most intimate
personal experiences, on such an approach.
As to the initial assumptions, science can
not even get underway without a commit
ment to those basic moral obligations upon
which all knowledge depends, such as the
intrinsic superiority of honesty over dis
honesty, of objectivity over caprice in
expetimentation, as well as the broad as
sumptions of the intelligibility of the un
iverse and of the value of truth as against
superstition The whole scientific enter
prise is robbed of coherence if the shadow
of moral and rational relativity is cast
over these primary postulates.
What is clearly needed is a method
which retains meaning for all the valid
elements of human experience No appeal
simply to a philosophic method, nor to a
revelational method, is self-sufficient, for
philosophic methods are legion and com
peting revelation-claims must likewise be
tested. We must not abandon crucial areas
of human experience to unrelieved par
adox, but rather, rise to that coherence
which retains significance for every le
gitimate aspect of life and history. The
fact that some philosophers in the name
of coherence, have settled for idealistic
and sub-Christian interpretations of real
ity need not trouble the Christian, as long
as he can press the case that the coherence
of the facts of science, values, and of
God is more profound and complex than
the truncated coherence which is some
times preferred. Just as science, within the
arbitrarily fixed limits of its methodology,
cannot attain to more than a partial under
standing of its data, so too the attempt to
make room for an objective spiritual and
moral order does not attain a fully coher
ent expression apart from a proper cen-
trality for that special divine revelation
centering in the Hebrew-Christian scrip
tures and fulfilled in Jesus Christ. A view
of existence which asserts an abiding
truth and goodness makes room for its
own affirmations about scientific phe
nomena, but it is not so coherent as a view
which is alert to special divine revelation,
for that alone affords a compelling the
istic framework to underwrite the object
ivity of genuine religious and moral en
counter.
In the recovery of morality, scientists
today bear a heavy responsibility. As they
conveyed to the modem world the impres
sion that scientific discoveries have over
thrown Biblical supernaturalism, they must
now contend with equal vitality�if they
are in earnest about super-scientific
knowlede�for the relevance of that same
objective spiritual and moral order which
once they denied. That is not an easy task.
For one thing, scientism spurred the cul
tural descent to naturalism, but the scien
tist by themselves cannot spur a cultural
ascent to Christian conviction. Much more
in the way of personal spiritual encounter
and decision is involved in such an ex-
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change. The overthrow of relativistic ex
pediency in the interest of Biblical moral
ity is not a reversal to which humanity is
naturally inclined. Furthermore, the aban
donment of the optimistic notion of the
essential goodness of man may be made to
yield as much comfort to naturalism as to
Biblical theism. If man is no longer, at
the core of his being, to be viewed as a
minor deity, is the dominance of brute
impulses to be interpreted along the pat
tern of man's essential animality? That is
a crucial question today, and the whole
movement of recent science has not for
mulated any unambiguous case for man's
essential super-animality.
The case for an ojective morality can
not be separated today, any more that it
was in the early Christian ages, from the
issue of divine revelation. There is only
one effective alternative to the illusion
of man's animality, as also to the illusion
of his essential deity, and that is that man
is a sinner. He is not a miniature God,
but he is a creature made in the image of
the holy Lord of the universe. He is not
an animal, but he is a fallen sinner in
revolt against his Maker, and is morally
responsible for his defection. That is the
proclamation of revealed religion. In the
Hebrew-Christian scriptures alone is God
self-disclosed as the ultimate source of our
moral distinctions, and as so holy that he
does not gloss over the sinfulness of man.
He is so holy that he neither overlooks
sin, nor accepts the best offerings of
tarnished hands and hearts as the equiva
lent of the divine standard of holiness. He
declares instead that man cannot save him
self, so radical is the plight of fallen hu
manity, yet that God in sovereign mercy
promises and provides in Christ that alone
sufficient salvation.
That view of objective holiness alone
stands in sufficient judgment upon the
moral complacency of modern man, re
acting to sin with a high cosmic serious
ness. There alone is found the offer of a
redemptive dynamic sufficient to lift man
beyond egoistic and destructive impulses.
There alone is the message which, if made
the context for the modern scientific pur
suit, will enable scientism to redeem the
time which it has spent in undermining
the relevance of Christian supernaturalism
and the moral demand of reality upon
men's minds and hearts.
There is no effective plea for an objec
tive morality, except in terms of the divine
revelation spoken by God to man. It is be
cause God has spoken that we know our
selves at once as objects of His cre
ative and of His redemptive love. It is
as we acknowledge our sinfulness and our
need of His mercy that we come to ex
perience God as the supreme value of life,
and as the source of changeless moral
norms.
That may not be a message with which
modern science is primarily concerned,
but unless the modern scientist makes it
a primary concern, he cannot escape de
livering our age to barbarism and despair.
Indifference to essential Christianity
means indifference to values, and indif
ference to values will sooner or later clear
ly imply the valuelessness of science in
the most significant areas of human life.
Dee W. Cobb
As students in increasing numbers pour into the halls of Asbury Seminary, and
the list of our alumni is constantly increasing, we are made more and more
aware of the growing importance of the work of the Alumni Association.
Institutions like Asbury Seminary, which are not supported by any denomi
nation, nor richly endowed by any philanthropist, must naturally turn to
its alumni for that kind of solid backing which will advertise the school before
the general public, and thus often prove effective in turning some of God's money
into this channel, if it is to build a school which can promptly receive those
clamoring for admission and adequately equip them to go out and serve our needy
world.
That is the reason we need a strong Alumni Association. In the years ahead
the strength of the Seminary will be determined in a large measure by the
strength of the Alumni Association. We need not only the strength of numbers ;
we need the strength of unity, the strength of a group solidly welded together in
the bonds of Christian fellowship and in a great loyalty to the school which means
so much to us. The old alibi of importance, "What can one person do?" is still
being sounded by many people in our world who simply don't want to do any
thing. At the same time it is being demonstrated again and again that "one per
son" can often do some astounding things when he sets himself to the job. Some
of our individual alumni are proving that to be true. If big things can be done
by these singly, how much more ought we as an Association to be able to do.
There is no denying that the Seminary is definitely on the upgrade. God is
prospering. His Spirit is leading. If we will continue to pray and give and adver
tise, soon we shall have a seminary second to none. We believe this to be a laud
able objective.
Be sure to plan to attend Ministers' Conference. A number of vital matters
will face your Board of Directors in their meeting at that time. So pray for us,
and feel free to express yourself on matters of Alumni business at any time.
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"Civilization On Trial"
An Appraisal by
DuvoN C. Corbitt
Members of the historical fraternity ap
proach the writings of Professor Arnold
J. Toynbee in the spirit of the Apostle
Peter : "Brother Paul . . . hath written some
things hard to be understood." The senti
ment has been well expressed by the late
Dr. Charles A. Beard in a review of vols.
V and VI of Toynbee's A Study of His
tory:
It is highly doubtful whether any scholar in
America, or any other part of the world, could
control and check the enormous number of re
ferences to personalities, theories, events, and
facts scattered through many centuries and over
a large part of the earth's surface. Nor will it
be easy for readers to discover the meaning
of such matters as Mr. Toynbee's handling of
contempory communism in the light of the fate
of other religious or philisophico-religious move
ments that have turned militant, for example,
anti-Hellenic Judaism and Zoroastrianism of the
Syriac world in the post-Alexandrine age or
the militant Muslim-Hindu syncretistic religion
of Sikhism. (^American Historical Review, April,
1940, p. 594)
Dr. Beard put his finger on the princi
pal difficulties when he added:
Any summary of Mr. Toynbee's findings, con
clusions, or reflection for the purposes of re
view is bound to be inadequate. Nor is it easy
to discover and set forth the spirit and method
of his procedure. His erudition is immense; he
ranges far and wide in time and space; he em
ploys literature in many languages; and he in
dulges in metaphors which elude mere positivists.
Some fragments of imaginative metaphysics un
derlie the structures of his chapters, but it is
scarcely possible to make a system of these frag
ments; nor does it appear that the author has
made up his own mind on the point of the ulti
mate design of the universe about which he is
speaking at great length. His erudition and his
metaphysics, combined with metaphorical lan
guage and use of analogies, give a peculiar and
elusive character to the whole. There is nothing
like it in the English tongue. For a comparison
it is necessary to resort to such works as Spen-
gler's Decline of the West and Hegel's Phil
osophy of History. Yet Mr. Toynbee's erudition
makes Spengler look like a petty sciolist, and
his catholicity of thought makes Hegel's dogma
tism sound like the scream of a Prussian drill
sergeant (Ibid., pp. 563-594)
It is the purpose of this article to sur
vey Toynbee's latest volume. Civilization
on Trial (Oxford University Press, 1948),
which is something of a condensation of
his larger work, with a view to discovery
whether in his study as a whole he may
have something to say which is relevant to
our contemporary understanding, not only
of history, but also of the deeper human
problem which history objectifies.
Truly Professor Toynbee's erudition is
immense. Beginning with the priceless
heritage of a classical education, he has
added to it wide, if not always deep, read
ing in the history of civilizations, religions,
philosophies and nations. Much learning
has not made him mad, but it has tempted
him into formulating a philosophy - yea,
both a philosophy and a theology - of his
tory. He sees history repeating itself, not
in specific events, but in a kind of cycle
of birth, development and death of civili
zations. Civilizations are bom. If they
meet challenges that are too great or too
small, they become stagnant, or arrested.
If, on the other hand, they meet those that
are just right, they develop into univer
sal civilizations before they disintegrate
and give rise to other civilizations. In an
early chapter of his recent collection of
essays Professor Toynbee put his credo
in these words:
Briefly stated, the regular pattern of social
disintegration is a schism of the disintegrating
society into a recalcitrant proletariat and a less
and less effectively dominant minority. The pro
cess of disintegration does not proceed evenly;
it jolts along in altering spasms of rout, rally,
CIVILIZATION ON TRIAL 101
and rout. In the last rally but one, the domin
ant minority succeeds in temporarily arresting soc
iety's lethal self-laceration by imposing on it the
peace of a xiniversal state. Within the framework
of the dominant minority's universal state the
proletariat creates a vmiversal church, and after
the next rout, in which the disintegrating civil
ization finally dissolves, the universal church may
live on to become the chrysalis from which a
new civilization eventually emerges. {Ciivilisation
on Trial, p.13)
But in a later chapter of the same col
lection he took issue with himself. One
view of history, he thought, might con
sider Christianity, "as it were, the egg,
grub, and chrysalis between butterfly and
butterfly ... a transitional thing which
bridges the gap between one civilization
and another." "I confess," he adds, "that
I myself held this rather patronizing view
for many years. {Cilivization on Trial,
p. 231) Then he explained his view:
"There will be no reason to suppose that
Christianity itself will be superseded by
some distinct, separate, different higher
religion which will serve as a chrysaUs
between our present Western civilization
and the birth of its children." Rather"
the truth is the other way round . . . civil
ization may break up, but the replacement
of one higher religion by another will not
be a necessary consequence. So far from
that, if our secular Western Civilization
perishes, Christianity may be expected not
only to endure but to grow in wisdom and
stature as a result of a fresh experience of
secular catastrophe." Another suggestion
is that "The Christian Church as an in
stitution may be left as the social heir of
all the other Churches and all the civil
izations." {Civilization on Trial, pp. 238-
.240)
Theologians and perhaps most histor-
torians will find it easy to agree with
this last prediction of Professor Toynbee,
however much they may question the tor
tuous reasoning that led him to it. They
will be interested in the question that he
raises. If, when the ephemeral societies
of the civilizations of the past six thous
and years culminate in "a single world
wide and enduring representative in the
shape of the Christian Church," "would
it mean that the Kingdom of Heaven
would then have been estabUshed on
Earth?" Toynbee's answer is an emphatic
"No!" The "reason lies in the nature of
society and in the nature of man." "Un
less and until human nature itself under
goes a moral mutation which would make
an essential change in its character, the
possibility of evil as well as good will be
born into the world afresh with every
child and will never be wholly ruled out as
long as one child remains alive. This is
as much as to say that the replacement of
a multiplicity of civilizations by a un
iversal church would not have purged hu
man nature of original sin." And, says
Professor Toynbee, "this leads to another
consideration: so long as original sin re
mains an element in human nature, Caesar
will always have work to do and there
will still be Caesar's things to be rendered
to Caesar, as well as God's to God, in
this world." {Civilization on Trial, pp.
240-241)
Critics can point out, and some have,
errors of fact and interpretation that cast
doubt on Professor Toynbee's "thesis of
the parallelism, and philosophical contem
poraneity of civilizations." Even novelist
Kenneth Roberts has devastated the con
clusions drawn from a comparison of
Maine with other parts of New England.
("Don't Say that about Maine," Saturday
Evening Post, November 6, 1948) Psy
chologist Abram Kardiner has been even
more cutting in his analysis of Toynbee's
"views and methods," {Scientific Ameri
can, August, 1948, pp. 58-59). It would
be easy to tear apart the parallels drawn
between North Carolina and her neighbors
on either side. Latin Americanists find ob
jections to the conclusions drawn from the
history of the Incas and the Mayas, and
from the history of Spain's expansion over
seas. As Dr. Beard had indicated, no scho
lar is specialist enough in all fields of his
tory to check the errors of fact and inter
pretation in Professor Toynbee's whole
works, but each in his small corner, is be
ginning to tear apart the philosophy of the
most-talked-of historian philosopher of the
moment.
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I should like to lay criticism aside and
thank Professor Toynbee for reminding
us that we must look beyond the changing
boundaries of individual states to the es
sential unity of civilization. The civilization
of the United States cannot be understood
even by a study of the history of the
United States and England. The whole
field of Western civilization is too small
for the purpose. We must transcend that
and turn to Greece, Rome, Persia, Syria,
Palestine, yea, v. - can scarcely omit any of
them that have gone before. It is a hope
ful sign that Professor Toynbee reminds
religious thinkers than man is not essential
ly good, that in our efforts to bring in the
millennium by good works, we must not
lose sight of the fact that "original sin" is
still with us and will be as long as one
member of the human race inhabits this
globe.
Arminianism In American
Religious Life
Harold B. Kuhn
The man from whom Arminian Theo
logy derives its name is much less known
than the movement itself. Born at Onder-
water in The Netherlands in 1560, Jacobus
Arminius (latinized from Harmensen)
studied theology in Utrecht and Leyden,
and later in Geneva under the famous
Calvinist Beza. Shortly after his ordination
in 1588, he was commissioned to defend
Beza's doctrine of Predestination against
proposed changes. In the course of his
studies, he came to adopt the positions
which he had undertaken to refute. Upon
his appointment to a professorship in theo
logy in Leyden in 1603, he found himself
almost immediately in conflict with
Gomarus. who was for the remaining
years of Arminius' life to be his chief op
ponent.
Beginning with an examination of Beza's
doctrine of Predestination, Arminius short
ly found himself questioning other Cal-
vinistic formulations. Before noting these,
it is necessary to observe that he essentially
re-defined the Reformed teaching of pre
destination, in terms as follows: God pre
destines men to salvation upon the basis of
His foresight of what men will do, not (as
Gomarus held) upon the basis of an ar
bitrary election to salvation, with a conse
quent reprobation of others. The classic
Calvinistic position concerning repentance
and faith was that God awakens men to
these responses because they are predeter
mined to salvation. This, Arminius felt,
confounded human and divine acts, and
neutralized human freedom.
In reformulating this tenet, Arminius
found himself in conflict with other prin
ciples of high Reformed teaching. The
teaching of Total Depravity, as currently
formulated, seemed likewise in conflict
with what he felt to be the Christian doc
trine of human freedom. Unconditional
Election (with its corollary of uncondition
al reprobation,) seemed open to the same
objection. The tenet of a Limited Atone
ment seemed inconsistent with clear state
ments of Scripture which offered salvation
to all men. Irresistable Grace appeared to
him a teaching which stood or fell with
Unconditional Election, as did also the
tenet of Unconditional Perseverance.
Arminius did not live to see the issues
between himself and Dutch Calvinism re
solved by S)mod, for he died in 1609 be
fore the meeting of such a Synod, in the
calling of which he was largely instru
mental. He did not himself formulate an
anti-Calvinistic system; and in The Nether
lands, Arminianism was rather a Remon
strant movement within the Reformed
Church than an institutionalized theology.
It may be said also that his followers were
more Arminian than was he himself. At the
Synod of Dort (1618-1619) about three
hundred of Arminians, mostly clergymen
and including the eminent Simon Epis-
copius, were expelled. Nevertheless, ar
minian teachings exerted a powerful in
fluence upon Dutch theology, and were
echoed in the Church of England by the
Latitudinarian Movement.
It remained for a new movement in
British theology to knit Arminianism into
a theology in its own right. The Wesleys,
forced by circumstances to pursue their
work outside the Church of England, gave
to Arminianism a new life. John Wesley
shared that which has been a common
factor in Arminian thought, namely an
aversion to the harsher aspects of Calvin-
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ism. We must not, however, suppose that
Wesley merely took over the work of
Arminius and the Remonstrants whole
sale; rather, he added some distinctively
new features, notably two: the doctrine of
the Witness of the Spirit ; and the doctrine
of Entire Sanctification.
The significance of Arminianism for
American theology grows in large part out
of the development of Wesley's thought.
Before tracing this, however, it is necessary
that we observe within American Calvin
ism a reaction against some of its features
- - in fact, against the same factors which
Arminius himself found inacceptable. This
reaction had assumed such proportion that
by the middle of the eighteenth century,
Jonathan Edwards was occupied with the
question. By this time, Arminian had be
come a term of reproach, applied to those
opponents of Puritanism who found the
doctrine of human spiritual inability in-
acceptable. In this sense, Arminianism in
New England was similar to the movement
in The Netherlands, namely an unorganized
protest movement, centering in theological
institutions, but without specific eccles
iastical form. One gets the impression from
Calvinistic polemic of this period that the
term Arminian had become something of
an emotionally-charged word, employed
rather loosely to discredit those who ques
tioned the formulation of high Calvinism
from the point of view of either Scripture
or of personal philosophy.
In addition to the effect which this un
official form of the Arminian movement
exerted upon the theology of America,
there was brought to bear upon our scene
a much more powerful form of anti-Cal
vinistic theology in the Methodist move
ment. Beginning about the middle of the
eighteenth century, the followers of Wes
ley penetrated the Colonies, and into the
hinter-land of America in a manner which
affords one of the most romantic chapters
in our religious history. Trained in the
theology of John Weslev. which
was largely embodied in his Sermons,
preachers of varied degrees of education
penetrated the wilderness by horseback,
evangelizing as they went, and establishing
Methodist Societies at a rate almost im-
paralleled in church history.
Emphases of the message of the Meth
odists were, especially, personal respon
sibility and possible salvation for all men.
Both of these were specifically derived
from Arminius' tenets. They resulted in a
brand of aggressive evangelism which not
only produced a phenomenal growth, but
also was a dynamic force in christianizing
American life at its cutting edge. At the
same time, apart from the direct results
achieved by Methodist evangelism, there
were repercussions within nominally Cal
vinistic denominations. Whereas strict Cal
vinism would produce one type of evange
listic approach, Arminianism would log
ically produce another. In point of fact,
frontier evangelism within all groups came
to conform to the free-will pattern.
With the growth of Methodism came the
development of her fixed institutions�
colleges, theological schools, and the like.
The theological seminaries became centers
for the systematic and scholarly exposition
of the Arminian-Wesleyan theology, and
produced, particularly in the nineteenth
century, a group of very able scholars and
a formidable theological literature. Coming
later in point of time than the Presby
terians with their Princeton University,
the Methodists exerted through their
universities a profound influence upon
American life.
The institutional impact of Arminianism
upon our national life was paralleled by
its effect upon the theological atmosphere.
Before noting this, however, it is helpful
to observe that in The Netherlands, Ar
minian theology tended, following the
death of its immediate formulators, to
become attenuated. Some of its adherents
became Arian in their Christology; and in
general, the Dutch movement succumbed
to the impact of liberal theology. In
America, however, Wesleyanism remained,
through the larger part of the nineteenth
century, a vigorous opponent of the New
England form of Arianism. It is the stud
ied oninion of this writer that Methodism.
up until approximately 189�. compared
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favorably in this respect with the Calvin
istic denominations.
During the nineteenth century, there
were frequent controversies between Ar
minians and Calvinists, out of which grew
numerous articles in periodicals, and oc
casional volumes such as the able but
repetititous work Objections to Calvinism
by Randolph S. Foster. In general, this
controversy raged about the theoretical
aspects of high Calvinism which were sel
dom the subject of public preaching.
Whatever good purposes may have been
served by this controversy, it certainly
had the effect of concentrating the atten
tion of many able Methodist upon Calvin
ism, as though the Geneva theology were
the chief opponent of Christianity. This
undeniably drew their efforts away from
the task of meeting the real foe of historic
Christianity, namely theological liberalism.
As a result, when the impact of German
thought began to be felt as a consequence
of the fashionable student exchanges be
tween American theological seminaries
and the theological faculties of Germany,
Methodist theologians were caught nap
ping, or, to say the least, so engaged in
combatting a fellow-movement as to be un
prepared for the real conflict.
The writer is prepared to encounter
difference of opinion with respect to this
last point. Some Methodists will feel that
Calvinism was the foe, and that Liber
alism came to free American Arminianism
from both this enemy and also the "schol
asticism" which they inherited from Tohn
Weslev. Calvinists will likewise observe
that Methodism succumbed, in large meas
ure, to Liberalism because of the inher
ent weakness of all forms of Arminian
theology. He feels, however, that some
thing can be said for the view that, given
a proper view of the issues involved and
proper preparation, Arminianism is as
able to defend itself against its foes as is
Calvinism.
At this point it is well to give brief
notice to the particular form which Lib
eralism has assumed within the Arminian
movement. In view of the orientation of
Methodism in the direction of large em
phasis upon experience, one might expect
to discover in its liberalized form a re
action against theology, and a concen
tration of emphasis upon subjective ex
periences as sources of religious truth.
Sharing with the liberal movement in gen
eral an acceptance of conventional higher
biblical criticism, with a consequent de
preciation of Scripture as a final authority,
it faced the common task of discovering a
source of authority consistent with its
general principles. This task has been un
dertaken at two levels, the first in rather
popular fashion, the second at a more so
phisticated level.
In the first instance, there came, chiefly
through the popular literature of the
Church School and Youth Societies, a
general depreciation of religious orthodoxy,
in favor of "the life." Objective truth in
religion was subordinated to the insights
which came to men of good heart and of
good will. At the same time, the two crisis
religious experiences which were the
strength of historic Methodism (namely,
conversion and entire sanctification) were
replaced in emphasis by "experiences'*
which were presumably common to all men,
and relatively independent of the accep
tance of Christian theology. In place of
the New Birth, there came an emphasis
upon life's several transitional experiences
as "new births" and a guided reaction
against "narrowing" the term *new birth*
to any specific reeenerating experience.
Emphasis was shifted from conversion to
growth, from evangelism to relieious ed
ucation. This does not mean that the term
'evaneelism* was eliminated, but rather
that it was radicallv reformulated so as to
not onlv draw emphasis from the evpticre-
listic procedures which made Methodism
great, but also identified them with the
rather unsophisticated life of the frontier.
and hence no longer relevant to the life
of the church.
The other level at which the reauest for
a new religious authority was undertaken
was that of Empirical Theology. Taking
as a point of departure the postulate that
Personality was the final and irreducible
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element in the universe, the currents of
liberal Arminian thought were guided in
the direction of the philosophy of Per
sonal Idealism. This embodied much of
the work of Renouvier and Lotze, though
its advocates have latterly tended to find
in it a "Perennial Philosophy" and to find
all true philosophy since Plato to be really
a form of Personal IdeaHsm. It would un
duly expand this article to sketch in detail
the philosophcal movement initated by
Borden Parker Bowne, pupil of Hermann
Lotze. It must be said, however, that it is
a very thorough and well-knit system, em
bodying an idealistic metaphysics, a rug
ged value-ethics, and a daring theology.
Relevant to this discussion, two points
deserve special mention. First, Personal
Idealism is a stalwart defender of man's
moral freedom. Having critically examined
the factors which serve in some measure to
determine human conduct, it preserves at
this point the genius of Arminianism in its
contention that after all determining fac
tors are recognized, there remains yet to
every person a tight area within which he
is immune from constraint, and in which
he is competent to not only hand down dis
criminatory moral judgements, but also to
commit himself in the most profound
moral and spiritual sense.
The second point which is worthy of
mention is the tendency within Personal
Idealism to make man's negative moral
experience (namely his experience with the
problem of evil) determinative for the
ology. This has been accompanied by
thorough analysis of the moral situation,
and latterly by the assertion that there is an
irreducible residue of evil in the universe,
the presence of which is irreconcilable with
the existence of a God who is both morally
perfect (holy) and completely powerful
(omnipotent). This has led to the formu
lation of the position of Theistic Finitism
(doctrine of a limited God). The advocates
of the system contend that the realities of
the universe demand the recognition of an
antithesis between a God of all-power and
a God of all-goodness. Personal Idealists
find little difficulty in sacrificing the first
in favor of the second.
The theological implications of such a
teaching are obviously profound; it is diffi
cult (or impossible) to reconcile them with
the historic principles of the Methodist
Church as embodied in the Twenty-Five
Articles. In general, however, the ground
has been prepared in the major sections of
the denomination for the subordination of
historic principles of Christianity to what
are held to be the clear dictates of ex
perience. With respect to the doctrine of
salvation, upon which the emphasis in
Arminianism has been strong, the newer
theology based upon empiricism shifts the
emphasis from what God does for man to
zuhat God does alongside man, from God in
Christ suffering for man to what God, in
volved in the same moral schizophrenia
as man, suffers along with man. From
some points of view at least, the outcome
of the moral enterprise is uncertain. One
duty lies clearly before man, namely to take
place alongside a struggling God in His
struggle for Value. Salvation thus comes,
not by Grace, but as a result of a life slant
ed in a certain direction. "Salvation" thus
becomes a matter of moral endeavor and
is in no vital way related to the death of
Christ.
In this connection, one problem deserves
special attention : is this movement in
Arminian theology the inevitable outcome
of Arminian principles? Does this reversal
of historic Christian theology, which Per
sonal Idealism implies, follow from those
elements in the Arminian approach which
it holds in reaction against Calvinism?
Some will reply to these queries with a has
ty affirmative. Calvinists will feel that Ar
minianism, in its emphasis upon some
measure of human initiative in repentance,
has done despite to the doctrine of the
divine sovereignty, and has left open the
gate to the final renunciation of that
sovereignty. Against this argument, some
Arminians will reply that those denomi
nations which have been historically Cal
vinistic have by no means a perfect record
in the matter of maintaining high views of
God, and that their deviations from his
toric Christianity are no more to be at
tributed to their historic Calvinism than
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are those of methodistic Arminianism to be
laid at the door of her opposition to the
doctrine of the Divine Decrees as under
stood by Calvin. Perhaps this is not a
strong argument; what it really seems to
signify is, that the clue to the success of
theological Uberalism in the major denomi
nations is to be found elsewhere than in
their respective attitudes at one point in
their theology.
A final consideration in this paper is the
newer historic form which the Arminian
movement has assumed in America. It is
noteworthy that Arminianism was a power
ful guiding force in the religious life
of German immigrants of the nineteenth
century. There arose in consequence two
Churches of strong Arminian principles,
namely the United Brethren and the Evan
gelical Church, newly imited to become the
Evangelical United Brethren Church. In
general, these bodies have maintained their
historic doctrinal principles longer than
the largest exponent of Arminianism; lat
terly, however, Uberalizing tendencies have
become prominent in the life of these
bodies.
During the nineteenth century, two sig
nificant types of schism occurred within
the Methodist Chuch. The first was the
general schism, occasioned by a sociological
question which divided the nation as a
whole. As a result, the Methodist Church
South pursued its independent existence
until about 1940. There was also the second
form, the schism in which a smaller group
separated itself from the major body, and
maintained a separate existence in the
same general geographic location. This sec
ond form of schism produced, especially,
three bodies, the Methodist Prostestant
Church, the Free Methodist Church, and
the Wesleyan Methodist. (There were also
smaller splinter churches, none of which
has however become sufficiently large to be
reckoned as a force in determining the
course of Arminian theology.
The two mentioned last, namely the Free
Methodist and the Wesleyan Methodist
Churches, have served a special function
within the Arminian movement, namely
that of conserving explicitly the historic
positions of Methodist-Arminian beUef.
These bodies have grown to significant
size, have developed their own organi
zations to an efficiency comparable to that
of the parent body, have maintained their
own schools at the collegiate level, and are
now developing graduate theological train
ing. It needs to be said that neither of these
bodies have sought to develop an indepen
dent or 'characteristic' school of theology.
They have, however, maintained their his
toric doctrinal positions and have succeeded
in formulating them in such a manner as
to make them satisfying to a constituency
which includes a high percentage of well-
trained and critical persons.
Something needs to be said concerning
the independent bodies which have arisen
within the Arminian movement during the
past half century. The largest of these is
the Church of the Nazarene, which has
gathered its large membership not only
from the unchurched, but also from the
liberalized Arminian bodies, many of
whose members found the newer forms of
theology unsatisfying. For some years, the
Nazarene Movement has shown a pheno
menal growth, being one of the most rapid
ly growing Churches in America. It, and
its offshoot, the Pilgrim Holiness Church,
has followed much the same doctrinal
course as the two Methodist bodies just
mentioned.
It would require much space to chronicle
the remaining bodies which have pursued
the Arminian tradition in America, some of
which like the Mennonites have had their
largest constituency among immigrants
from northern Europe who have contribu
ted so richly to our rural America. Like
wise, in the Evangelical wing of Quakerism,
as expressed by the followers of J. J.
Gumey, Arminianism has been a dominant
doctrinal force. Mention must be made,
however, of a newer and somewhat irregu
lar movement, namely the so-called Pente
costal Movement. It is too early to assess
the importance of this branch of the
Church. With respect to its doctrine, it is
safe to say that it is partly related to Arm-
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inianism, and partly to the ecstatic move
ments which have appeared occasionally
during the history of the Church.
It may be said, in conclusion, that the
Arminian Movement played a role of
superlative significance during the for
mative period of our nation, both in its
direct impact upon the life of the expand
ing territories which comprise the United
States, and also in the impetus which it
gave to aggressive evangelism in the
Calvinistic bodies. Possibly it is not going
too far to observe that its emphasis upon
personal responsibiUty and personal in-
itative contributed also to the general de
mocratic tone of our national life. Cer
tainly the Arminian emphasis upon holi
ness of life has profoundly influenced the
tone of our social structure, which until
recently has been in reasonable agreement
with the older practical ethic of Metho
dism, which condemned intemperance,
divorce, gambling, and the like. It is signi
ficant that the weakening of sentiment
against these and kindred evils in Ameri
can society has been parallel to the re
laxation of standards in the major
Arminian denominations.
With reference to the future, the pro
spects for Arminianism in American re
ligious life seem two-fold. First, the de
nominations in which liberalism has come
to be the prevailing theological mood, hav
ing already lost their historic Arminian
principles, will share the future which the
American scene will afford to liberal
Christianity in general. In this future, the
emphasis promises to be in the direction
of extreme stress upon human effort and
human endeavor, with a vigorous defense
of himian moral freedom. Whether the
movement will be able to maintain its
emphasis upon the unique value of per
sons in the face of the encroachment of
premature collectivisms remains to be
seen. Logically it should be a bulwark
against both the threatening ant-hill cul
tures and the materialism upon which they
are based.
In those areas of American church life
where orthodox Arminianism prevails,
there is a discernible tendency toward co
operation with all Evangelical groups, and
away from the historic conflict between
Arminianism and Calvinism. While re
cognizing and respecting mutual dif
ferences, both Arminians and Calvinists
(and it may be noted that most Cal
vinistic groups in America today hold
modified Genevan views) are realizing in
increasing measure that the emergency of
the times demands that little effort be ex
pended in internecine Christian conflict,
and that major emphasis be placed upon
a vigorous assertion of the principles of
historic Christianity. Leaders in both
groups are seeking to exploit the broad
areas of doctrinal agreement between the
theological movements, recognizing that
Arminianism and Calvinism are both ap
proaches to theology rather than distinct
theologies. These leaders likewise recognize
that the vastly increased dimensions of
their common task requires an increase in
common endeavor based upon a frank re
cognition of secondary differences within
the framework of agreement upon major
and essential tenets of the Christian Faith.
Sin and Sinfulness: A Study In
NewTestament Terminology
George Allen Turner and J. Harold Greenlee
The Subject Defined
The New Testament concept of grace
cannot be understood apart from its under
lying concept, the doctrine of sin. Perhaps
the most subtle aspect of Biblical hamartio-
logy is sinfulness, by which is meant, not
the act of sin, but the m.oial conditions
which cause sin. Wliile sins are properly
regarded as acts of rebellion against God
and are objective in nature, sinfulness is
a condition, principle, or state and hence is
subiective in nature. The former is related
to God, the latter to man. A study of sin
fulness the: efore involves psychology; here
hamartiology and anthropology converge.
Purpose Of The Study
With the exception of extended discus
sions of original sin, theologians and ex
positors have spent comparatively little
time on the subiective aspect of sin. Most
treatments of sin are content to deal with
the more obvious features of sinful con
duct, leaving many of the more subtle as
pects of sin unexplored or superficially
treated. It is the purpose of this study to
isolate and analvze this more evasive con
cept of the subjective aspect called inward
sin or sinfulness.
The Problem
The New Testament uses some nine dif
ferent synonyms for sin�^that is, nine
families of words. These nine svnonyms,
together with their cognates, total twenty
four different words. There are approxi
mately 386 occurrences of these synon5rms.
Of these, hamartia (d^iapTta) and its cog
nate forms are the most important and oc
cur most frequently, a total of about 214
times. The basic meaning of this term is
to miss the mark or the designated goal,
hence is the opposite of teleios (xiXsioq)
�complete, perfect, entire�and, es
pecially in Romans, to dikaiosune
(6iKaioo6vT)) �conformity to the stan
dard, to God.''
While the cautious student will bear in
mind that "in the common intercourse of
life, words easily lose their original pre
cision,"* yet a careful study of etymology
is indispensable. The statement is often
made that duaprta in the singular "would
seem to denote primarily, not sin consider
ed as an action, but sin considered as the
quality of action."* This generalization
needs to be substantiated. How accurate is
the statement? If true as a generalization
is it true of other New Testament writers
or is it a characteristic of Paul only? Does
Paul use the sinerular of this word to indi
cate a studied and precise distinction be
tween "sin" and "sinfulness"? Is it actually
a qualitative usage, as distinct from specific
acts, or is it simplv used to designate sins
in the aes'reeate? How valid is the con
ventional statement that the New Testa
ment writers are careful to maintain a dis
tinction between the principle of sin and
prts of sin? In other words, does the New
Testament recoenize a distinction between
sinful conduct and sinfulness in principle
as underlying sin, and can this generaliz
ation be substantiated on objective linguis
tic grounds?
Distinctions of this kind are admittedly
rare in the Old Testament, where a more
objective and physical view of sin prevails.
Intimations of the importance of motive,
of the sin principle, are, however, apparent
even in the Old Testament in such words
as avah (my) �^bent, crooked, perverse,
*H. Cremer, Biblico-Theological Lexicon of
New Testament Greek, I, p. 99.
*Umbreit, Die Sunde, p. 49, cited in Cremer
op. cit., p. 98.
'Cremer, op. eit, p. 100.
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Such words "represent the perversion or
distortion of nature which is caused
by evil doing."* The prophets speak
of correcting the source of evil as well as
pardon (e.g., Ezek. 36:26, "the stony
heart"). The Psalmist also is concerned not
only with his sinful acts and resultant guilt
but also with their inner source (Ps. 51 :7,
10). Later writers of the inter-testamental
period are relatively more concerned with
the subjective side and with the source of
sin (e.g., IV Esdras 3:20-27; 4:30, 31;
7:118). Rabbinic sources indicate a similar
concern with the source of sin: "an evil
eye and the evil principle and hatred of
mankind drive a man out of the world"
(Pirke Aboth 2:15) ; and, "Who is migh
ty? He that controlleth his evil disposition"
(Pirke Aboth 4:29). The rabbis made
much of the Evil Yetzer ("evil imagi
nation", as in Gen. 6:5) as the source of
rebellious acts.*
Post-Reformation theological tradition
has emphasized the distinction between act
and principle, between source and conse
quence. Calvin: "We say, therefore, that
man is corrupted by a natural depravity,
but which did not originate from nature."'
Barclay : "... not only their words and
deeds only, but all their imaginations are
evil perpetually as proceeding from
this depraved and wicked seed
"*
This evil principle is usually identified with
"original sin," as in the Articles of Reli
gion in Anglican and Methodist churches.
Watson: "This connection of positive evil,
as the effect, with privation of life and
image of God, as the cause, accounts for
the 'corruption of man's nature.'" Wesley:
" the sin which still remains .... even
in them that are regenerate .... a con
viction of our proneness to evil, of an heart
*R. B. Girdlestone, Synonyms of the Old
Testament, p. 130. E. g., II Sam. 19:19.
�See S. Schecter, Some aspects of Rabbinic
Theology, pp. 219-93.
�John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Re
ligion, II, 1, p. 277.
^Robert Barclay, Theses Theologicae, cited by
Philio Schaff, The Creeds of Christendom, I,
p. 790.
�Richard Watson, Theological Institutes, II,
p. 79.
bent to backsliding, a conviction of
the sin still cleaving to all our words and
actions.'" None is more precise than a
Puritan preacher in Boston in 1699:
"Every actual sin leaves a spot, a stain, a
filthiness behind it. There is therefore a
two-fold taking away of sin, answerable
to the two-fold mischief which it doeth the
man, by its adhesion to him : the former
is by Justification, the latter by Sanctifi
cation."" Likewise Kuizenga :
"The personal nature both of sin and salvation
make necessary not only the experience of con
version but also the nature of sanctification.""
Mozeley: " there is a goodness and
a sinfulness in disposition as well as in
acts."" The question now raised is whether
these theologians and expositors have cor
rectly supposed that a qualitative dis
tinction between sins and sinfulness is
set forth in the New Testament.
Grammarians as well as theologians
streak of the two-fold nature of sin.
Trench quotes Chrysostom as distinguish
ing between hamartia (anaprta) as desig
nating original sin and hamartema
(&[i&prY\\La) as "the several acts and out-
com'T^.crc. of Sin" from which infants are
free." Cremer, in the work previously cited,
concludes that ot^apxia in the singular with
the article designates sin as "a principle
manifestinp- itself in the conduct of the
subject. Without the article d^apxla .... is
used where the reference is to the idea it
self and not to the collective sum of mani
festations."" Likewise Thayer:
In this sense f| d^iaptla ... as a power exer
cising dominion over men (sin as a principle and
power) is rhetorically represented as an imperial
personage . . . ; the dictate of sin or an impulse
�John Wesley, 'The Scripture Way of Sal
vation," Standard Sermons, II, pp. 454 ff.
"Samuel Williard, The Fountain Opened, pp.
78f.
"John A. Kuizenga, "Sin," International
Standard Bible Encyclopedia, IV, 2801.
"J. B. Mozeley, Predestination, cited in James
Orr. Sin as a Prdblem of Today, p. 240.
"R. C. Trench, Synonyms of the New Tes
tament, 7th ed., p. 228.
"Cremer, op. cit., p. 101.
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proceeding from it Thus dt^apTia is the
source whence the several evil acts proceed."
But the quotations cited by Thayer in
support of these generalizations are, with
one exception, all from Paul's writings.
Is this a habit of Paul, due perhaps to the
influence of rabbinic modes of expression,
or is it a grammatical principle which was
generally observed? The investigation nar
rows down, therefore, to whether or not
dpaptLa in the singular designates a prin
ciple of sin which needs cleansing as dis
tinct from acts which need pardon.
The Evidence
From the standpoint of etymology,
dudpxri^ia signifies the result of action,
and duapxla signifies quality of an action."
Old Testament usage bears out these dis
tinctions in the case of the former but not
the latter. In the Greek Old Testament
both words mean "an act of sin," "a sin
committed." There may be partial excep
tion in the idea of "a sin offering," which
is expressed by ''^epl d^iapxtaq or a similar
phrase; but even in these instances the sin-
offering seems to be for a sin rather than
for sinfulness. In The Old Testament,
therefore, we must assume that both
d^iapxia and d^idpxrina are regular words
for an act of sin, and that the former
is more commonly used than the latter.
In the New Testament, on the other
hand, the distinction between these two
words is often clear. While dpapxia ap
pears more than 200 times, diAdpxri^a oc
curs only five times, according to Moulton
and Geden^s Concordance. The meaning
of dudpxTitia is always "an act of sin." As
the ratio of their frequency would sug
gest, d^iapxia also is used to mean an act
of sin; and it carries this meaning in
practically all of the 75 instances or so
where it is used in the plural. In the sin
gular, however, the situation is quite dif
ferent. After allowing for differences of
interpretation of some passages, it ap
pears that of the approximately 125 in-
"J. H. Thayer, Greek-English Lexicon of the
New Testament, p. 31.
"Samuel G. Green, Handbook to the Gram
mar of the Greek Testament, rev. ed., pp. 144-5.
stances of the singular of dtiapxia in the
New Testament, only between ten and
twenty designate an act of sin.
'Aiiapxta is used both with and without
the definite article. In the plural, the pre
sence or absence of the article would gen
erally imply only the difference between
definite and indefinite acts of sin. It is
the significance of this word when it is
used in the singular which is of particular
importance to this study.
In the New Testament, the word
dtiapxta without the article doubtless some
times designates an act of sin. In these
instances d^apxCa may be considered as sy
nonymous with di^dpxrina. Yet these in
stances are distinctly in the minority, com
prising no more than ten per cent.�pos
sibly much less�of the examples. In this
category may be listed Matt. 12:31, "every
sin and blasphemy" (ARV) ; II Cor. 11 :7,
"did I commit a sin" (ARV) ; and I John
5:16, "a sin which is not unto death,"
and "a sin unto death."
Much more common, however, are the
instances where duapxia seems to have the
very meanmg which its etymology suggests
�sinfulness, the quality of sin. It is a
commonly recognized grammatical prin
ciple that nouns may be thus used without
an article to denote quality. A very few of
the many available examples include John
13:35, "if ye have love one to another";
Rom. 14:15, "thou walkest no longer in
love" (ARV) �literally, according to
love"; Luke 2:14, "Glory to God in the
highest, and on earth peace"; and Matt.
17:20, "If ye have faith." d^apxla is not
thus used in the Synoptic Gospels, Matt.
12:31, cited above, being the only occur
rence of this word in the singular in these
gospels. From the Fourth Gospel may be
mentioned John 16 :8, "he will reprove the
world of sin" (similarly 16:9), and pos
sibly some other instances. In the First
Epistle of John, this idea seems jto be pre
sent in 1 :8, "If we say that we have no
sin"; 3:5, "in him is no sin"; and 5:17,
"All unrighteousness is sin"; and in Heb.
11 :25, "the pleasures of sin." In the Pauline
writings, the idea of quality is probably
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intended in Cor. 5 :21, "him . . . who knew
no sin" (better, "him who did not know
sin"). Most Pauline instances occur in Ro
mans: e.g., 3:20, "knowledge of sin";
5:13, "sin was in the world: but sin is not
imputed when there is no law"; 7:7, 'Ts
the law sin? '; and perhaps 8:10, "the body
is dead because of sin."
With the article, duapxia in the singu
lar sometimes refers to an act of sin, the
article denoting definiteness. Acts 7:60,
"lay not this sin to their charge," is an ex
ample. Yet obvious as such usage may
seem, the mstance just given is practically
unique in the New Testament.
A second usage with the article is foimd
in the examples where the phase refers to
sin in a generic or collective sense�that
is, in the same sense in wiiich the singular
"man" is used to mean "mankind," "the
hmnan race." This usage occurs in John
8:21, "ye � � � shaU die in your sin" ARV;
the Authorized Version incorrectly reads
"sins") �cf. verse 24, "ye shall die in
your sins�and in Rom. 5:20, "where sin
abounded."
Akin to the generic sense is the use of
the article to refer to a noun typical of its
class, as in the similar use of the word
"man" in Matt. 12:35, "The good man
out of his good treasure bringeth forth
good things: and the evil man out of his
evil treasure bringeth forth evil things"
(ARV; the Authorized Version incorrect
ly reads "a good man" and "an evil man").
In this passage, "the good man" and "the
evil man" is any good man and any evil
man, each being held up as representative
of all men of their class. Examples of this
use of the word "sin" are rather rare in
the New Testament, but an example prob
ably occurs in John 8 :34, "whosoever com-
mitteth sin," where the word "sin" may be
understood as any sin, standing as a rep
resentative of all sins.
By far the largest group of instances of
dtiaptla in the singular with the definite
article, however, are those in which, ac
cording to the regular grammatical rule,
the article seems to signify sin as an
abstract noun personified or made a sep
arate object of thought." This is similar to
the English custom of capitalizing an ab
stract noun when the noun is personified,
as in Acts 28:4, "whom .... Justice hath
not sutiered to live" (ARV). This usage
seems to comprise a great majority of the
occurrences of d^apTia�^the singular
noun with the definite article. As in the
common usage without the article, here
also, in thus picturing sin with personal
characteristics, as a figurative person or
"thing," the New Testament writers fol
low a practice recognized in the usage of
other abstract nouns. I Cor. 13:4-7 pre
sents an extended list of "personal" cha
racteristics of love (AV, "charity"). Rom.
5 :3-5 refers to tribulation, steadfastness,
approvedness, and hope (ARV) as work
ing or accomplishing goals, as though these
abstract ideas were objective realities. Eph.
2:14 speaks of Christ as "our peace," just
as we might speak of him as "our Lord,"
thus figuratively picturing peace as though
it were a person or "thing." (Contrast the
following verse, 2:15, where "peace" with
out the article denotes quality - - "making
peace.")
This personification of sin, dcnaptla,
or of picturing it figuratively as a "thing"
in itself, is particularly characteristic of
Rom. 5-8. Yet it is not unknown elsewhere
in the New Testament. John 8:34 refers
to being "the servant of sin," picturing
"Sin" as a master who rules. James 1 :15
figuratively pictures both "lust" and "sin"
as giving birth to offspring, which obvious
ly is literally possible only to living
beings." Heb. 3:13 thus speaks of sin as a
deceiver, and 12:4 as an enemy in warfare;
and in the light of the latter passage Heb.
12:1 doubtless refers to laying aside, not a
particular sin, as the AV and ARV both
seem to imply�"the sin which doth so
easily beset us"�but rather "sin" as a real
object (figuratively, of course) meaning the
"Green, op. cit., pp. 183-4.
"It is possible, however, that the article here is
used merely for definiteness, as ARV implies:
"
. . . drawn away by his own lust . . .
Then the lust, . . . beareth sin: and the sin,
. . . bringeth forth death."
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force, the idea itself, the principle of sin.*'
Not as a person, but as a material object,
I Cor. 15:56 graphically describes sin as
"the sting of death." In all this it must be
borne in mind, however, that this personi
fication of these abstract nouns, or consid
ering them as tangible objects, is purely
figurative. It must not be supposed that the
New Testament writers conceived of sin,
peace, etc., as material objects.
We may now turn to the occurrences of
f| dpapxia in Rom. 5-8, observing the use of
this phrase to describe sin, not as a partic
ular act of sin, not as the sum total of sins,
but as "Sin," a force or principle under
lying sinful acts. Since ottiapxia is capa
ble of the other meanings, it is possible that
a few instances here referred to may be
subject to alternative interpretations with
out invalidating the general conclusion.
The following passages are pertinent:
Rom. 5 :12, "sin entered into the world,
and death by sin." 5 :21, "sin hath reigned
unto death." 6:6ff., "the body of sin"; "he
died unto sin . . . , he liveth unto
God"; "dead indeed unto sin"; "Let not
sin therefore reign"; "Neither yield ye
your members . . . unto sin"; "ser
vants of sin"; "made free from sin"; "the
wages of sin . . . the gift of God."
7:8ff., "sin . . . wrought in me all
manner of concupiscence"; "sin revived,
and I died"; "sin . . . deceived me";
"that sin ... might become exceed
ing sinful" ; "sin that dwelleth in me" does
the evil ("Sin" ; not a particular act of sin).
Conclusions
It is sometimes suggested that r) duapxia,
particularly Paul's use of this expression
in Romans 5-8, refers to sin as a principle,
the idea being that the definite article pre
fixed to the noun is the identifying mark of
the sin principle. The present investigation
does not contradict this idea in general.
A more comprehensive point of view, how
ever, may be stated as follows: In general,
"See, e.g., Expositor's Greek Testament, ad loc.
d^iaptia in the New Testament refers, not
to an act of sin, hut rather to something
which underlies and issues in acts of sin,
something which also accompanies and
follows these acts of sin.
Without the definite article, this noun
refers particularly to sin from the point of
view of its quality, essence, or nature. It
carries the idea of sinfulness. Sinfulness,
being a quality, requires, not forgiveness,
but rather purging, removal, cleansing.
With the definite article, this noun regu
larly refers to "Sin"�sin as a force figu
ratively objectified, either as a person, able
to rule over man, to bring him into sub
jection to itself, and to act in a number of
ways as a personal agent would act; or as
some other material object, such as a
"sting." This usage is to be clearly distin
guished from the comparatively few in
stances where the same phrase is used to
refer to sin in a generic or collective sense,
as simply the totality of acts of sin. Here
again, sin is pictured, not as an act which
needs to be forgiven, but as a person who
must be put to death, a force which must
be rendered completely inoperative"
(Rom. 6:6), or as some other objective
reality which must be dealt with in a dras
tic manner.
In the New Testament, therefore, but
not commonly in the Old Testament,
d^apTia, when used in the singular, either
with or without the article, appears usu
ally to refer to ideas which are associated
with a need in the human heart which goes
beyond the need of forgiveness of sinful
acts, a need which arises from the pre
sence of sinful tendencies in man. The New
Testament seems clearly to teach that this
deeper need can and should be met. Gram
mar and exegesis, therefore, appear to bear
out the insights of generations of gospel
preachers, who, like the Puritan divine of
Boston, afifirm that "there is a two-fold
taking away of sin, answerable to the two
fold mischief which it doeth the man . **
History of American Congregationalism,
by Gaius Glenn Atkins and Frederick
L. Fagley. Boston, The Pilgrim Press.
432 pages. $2.00
Although many books have been written
about the beginning of Congregationalism
in England, and its subsequent growth in
America, after being transplanted to New
England, this book has been written to
emphasize the important developments in
American Congregationalism in the last
fifty years, as a result of its history.
The authors fulfil their purpose in a
commendable way. Both of the writers are
evidently well versed in Congregational
history and polity. Starting with the reli
gious situation in England at the end of
the Tudor Period and continuing to about
1942, the book recounts most important
events in Congregationalism in an in
structive and readable fashion.
Wei' known to many people are the ex-
neriences of the Pilgrims : first, in Scrooby,
England; then in Leyden, Holland; and
finally, in the Plymouth colony. Also well
known are the incidents connected with
Governor John Winthrop and the Puritans
in the Massachusetts Bay Colony. Not so
well known are the experiences of the
Plumber's Hall Society and Richard Fitz
in England; of the Norwich Church gath
ered under the leadership of Robert
Browne and terme.l "the first regularly
constituted Congregational church on Eng
lish soil" (p. 33) ; and of the Martin Mar-
Prelate Affair. All these events together
with the other important ones in the de
nomination's history are related and care
fully supported through the use of foot
notes.
Not only is the beginning and extension
of Congregationalism retold, but also fully
explained in detail are such things as the
formation of the denominational councils;
the founding of Congregational Colleges
and seminaries; the proposals for union
with other denominations ; the ministry in
Congregationalism ; and, in the last chapter,
a resume of Congregationalism as an ad
venture in religious liberty. It is evident
from a perusal of the contents of the book
that it is quite exhaustive and inclusive.
The formation of committees, councils,
and associations within Congregationalism
and the limits of the control of each group
have been vaguely understood by many
people, even by those who belong to the de
nomination. The chapters titled "The
Council : Its Formations and Changes In
Its Structure" and "The Council and The
Boards" are of great help in understanding
just how much cooperation is possible bet
ween individual churches that are so loose
ly knit together. "The churches were fac
ing the great problem which is inherent in
the very nature of democracy: how to
maintain individual independence and still
have sufficient cooperation to accomplish
results in common enterprises." pg. 201.
The authors have been very objective in
their presentation of all the facts and in
their interpretation of them. While inclined
to emphasize the valuable achievements of
their own denomination, they have done so
in a limited and conservative manner.
Due to the authorship by two persons
there is some repetition in the book. How
ever, as is stated in the foreword, this has
been kept at a minimum. The collaboration
of the two authors has resulted in an ex
cellent presentation of American Congre
gationalism. At the end of the book, there
are included the copies of some very im
portant statements of faith that have been
written by Congregationalists throughout
the denomination's history. This supple
ment, together with a very complete bib
liography of books that have been written
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about Congregationalism, adds greatly to
the value of this book under review.
To anyone who is a member of the Con
gregational-Christian Church or interested
in it and its background or interested in
the religious life of colonial New England,
the careful reading of this book will be re
warding and instructive.
Harvey L. Pierce
The Russian Idea, by Nicholas Berdyaev.
New York: The Macmillan Co., 1948.
255 pages. $3.00.
Berdyaev purposely avoids a merely
empirical portrayal of Russian history in
this volume. Such a history, he admits,
would prove repulsive since it would be
filled with many sordid details. Instead,
however, his main burden is: first, to ar
rive at some answer to the question, "what
was the thought of the Creator about Rus
sia," and, second, "to arrive at a picture of
the Russian people which can be grasped
by the mind, to arrive at the 'idea' of it."
Berdyaev prepares the reader for the
number of apparent contradictions in the
Russian Idea by indicating the high degree
of polarization in the Russian people. For
example, there is the element of humility
and self-denial, while at the same time
there is revolt caused by demanding jus
tice. Again, the Russians are compassion
ate, yet capable of gross cruelty. He sum
marizes these paradoxes by saying, "One
can be charmed by them, one can be disil
lusioned. The unexpected is always to be
expected from them."
After a brief historical introduction, the
author develops his theme by selecting
nineteenth century thinkers and writers as
illustrations of the Russian Idea. Dos-
toevsky, Tolstoy, Bakunin, Hertzen, and
others are carefully and skillfully analyzed.
Drawing from these pen portraits, Berd
yaev weaves the following threads into the
tapestry of the Russian Idea: The Russian
people are religious in their very make-up,
for religious unrest characterizes even the
unbelievers. Closely allied to this religious
spirit is a strong emphasis upon eschato-
logy. This element, combined with the fact
that the people are wedded to their soil,
leads the Russian to feel that somehow the
"new Jerusalem" is to be connected with
the vast Russian land. Finally, this Russian
spirit of religion bears a imique communal
character. Berdyaev admits that Russians
are less socialized than Western peoples,
but, he insists, they are infinitely more
community conscious, more ready for the
life in common. In this regard, the author
notes that the coming of the "new Jeru
salem" depends upon this spirit of com
munity and brotherhood, and, with pro
phet's voice, he concludes the volume with
the statement that the way is being pre
pared in Russia for a new revelation about
society which will usher in the era of the
Holy Spirit or the coming of the "new
Jerusalem."
This reviewer admittedly knows little
or nothing about the Russian mind; hence,
a critique of Berdyaev's analysis would be
mere presumption. A criticism might well
be aimed by some readers, however, at his
partial endorsement of the Russian
eschatology which will probably be con
sidered much too limited, too earth-bound,
and too nationalistic for most evangehcal
Christians, not to mention the fact that it it
a guarded endorsement of some type of
communism as the Christian ideal. Al
though Berdyaev has been more highly
esteemed by non-Russians than by his own
countrymen, his Russian Idea is one of the
more serious attempts to make clear to the
West the true Russia, her Church, and the
soul of her people. To anyone interested
in bettering his understanding in this res
pect, the book is worthy of careful reading.
Paul F. Abel
How the Church Grows, by Roy A. Burk-
hart. New York: Harper and Bro
thers. 200 pp. $2.00.
This book is based upon the premise that
the church is increasingly irrelevant in our
secular world. If it is to fulfill its mission
in the earth, it must be reborn. If this can
be evolved, the course of American his
tory may be radically changed. "If all the
half loyalty and the secret discipleship and
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the lukeworm fealty that are accorded to
God were suddenly to flame into fiery,
zealous devotion, this generation would
save an imperiled civilization." This would
mean a social salvation founded on hearts
cleansed and motivated by divine love.
It is probably true that every true shep
herd of God's people during the past two
thousand years has earnestly striven to
"stir the flame into fiery, zealous de
votion." Apparently, they haven't been too
successful. Dr. Burkhart undertakes to tell
us how it may be done. Among his many
suggestions, the following are typical.
1. There is need for new preaching. An
analysis is made of the message of present
day preaching. Some sermons center in the
Scriptures; others are experience-centered.
Some emphasize faith, others works; some
are personal, others social. In conservative
circles, there is much preaching on atone
ment, the second coming of Christ and
heaven and hell.
The seminaries are responsible in large
measure for the present inadequate role of
the church, for they major on training men
to preach while they give little or no prep
aration for leading people to a vital faith
and giving them the passion to live by it.
The results of this are seen in some very
disheartening statistics (quoted from an
other author). Only about five percent of
the membership of the contempory pro-
testant churches is truly sincere, while
perhaps another five percent participate
regularly in the life of the church.
2. It demands new leadership. The true
church ever seeks practical goals. There
fore, an adequate professional staff is
required to furnish specialized leadership
for the many activities beyond preaching
and pastoral work, including music, re
ligious education, psycho-therapy and vo
cational guidance. These leaders must be
recruited and trained at no little cost.
3. The key to success is the United
Church. Local churches must be combined
and denominations must merge. To realize
the True Church, vast resources will be
needed to support and carry out its enor
mously enlarged functions. But the world
economic and political issues demand this
United Church with its multiform pro
gram. This church will send out skilled
leadership to heal the body, to illumine the
mind, to guide the growth of the spirit,
to re-build the community, to direct proper
health, to distribute food, to revise and
organize the use of our natural resources,
to aid education, to strengthen the home
and to renew the church.
The author obviously envisions a
super-institution which will take over
and run our world. One will look far to
find a more comprehensive program for
the church advocated by churchmen, with
the possible exception of some of the
claims of the medieval popes.
Wilder R. Reynolds
Religion's Place in General Education, by
Nevin C. Harner, Richmond, Virginia :
John Knox Press, 1949. 167 pp. $2.50.
The author is Professor of Christian
Education in the Theological Seminary of
the Evangelical and Reformed Church in
the United States. He is also vice-chairman
of the International Coimcil of Religious
Education.
This new book includes four lectures
given by Dr. Harner at the Austin Pres
byterian Theological Seminary in Austin,
Texas and includes as an appendix a
voluminous report of a committee of the
American Council on Education on "The
Relation of Religion to Public Education."
The four lectures are entitled, "Religion
and Education� Indivisible"; "The Place
of Religion in General Education"; "An
Evaluation of Christian Current Pro-
pocals"; "The Distinctive Educational
Task of the Church."
Dr. Harner maintains in this work that
basically education and religion are one and
the same thing. He says that it is only
when a supernaturalism with its doctrine
of total depravity makes religion other
worldly, on the one hand, or a thorough
going humanism too secular, on the other,
that education ceases to be religious. The
religion of the churches and the secular
world of science should find common
ground, says the author.
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Discussing secularization of education he
names the various proposed solutions to
the problem of a religiously illiterate pop
ulace. The parochial school; week-day
school; teaching of religion as a social
phenomenon; the teaching of democracy,
are all inadequate measures. Religion
should be taught as it relates to all fields
of study in the cultural heritage. It remains
for the church to teach the Christian her
itage, including the Bible, church history,
Christian doctrine, liturgy, and to draw out
religion's deeper personal and ethical mean
ings.
The Appendix of 78 pages is a reprint
of a Committee Report of the American
Council on Education published in 1946.
This report discusses the impact of sec
ularism on religion and life. Religion is
defined as the giving of supreme allegiance
to ultimate reality. Attention is given to
the matter of a core curriculum in religion
for g-eneral education ; the secularistic de
finition of "Spiritual Values"; education
that negates religion ; the diversity of ex
isting policies and practices with respect
to religion and education ; the separation
of church and state ; week-day religious ed
ucation ; what should and may be done in
public schools : religion at the college and
teacher level ; the school the church and
the home; the spiritual replenishment of
modern culture.
Teaching is not only developing ability
to think but presenting a cultural her-
itafre about which to think. The student
cannot be brought into full possession of
his cultural heritage without the inclusion
of religion as an element in that heritage,
says the report.
However, to reduce religious beliefs to
a common denominator for a core cur
riculum in general education is out of the
question. There must be a distinction made
between teaching and indoctrination. Re
ligious leaders must have a meeting of
minds before the schools can take any
steps, for religion is to be taught without
indoctrination.
Higher education must deal with the par
adox of religious activity on the campus
-\'bilc science and philosophy are estab
lishing mind-sets which are average to re
ligion in all its forms.
These lectures and the report of the
committee reflect concern about the im
pact of secularism upon the life of our
people.
It appears to this reviewer to be regret
table indeed that a definition of religion
should be proposed in dealing with the so
lution of the problem of secularism which
takes religion directly into the ill it seeks to
cure. If, in order for education and religion
to be identical there must be mediation
between naturalism) and supernaturalism
the ground is yielded to naturalism. The
remedy takes on the disease.
If man is by nature as much inclined
"^ward God as he is toward sin and evil
so great an emphasis upon the reality of
God as supernaturalism imposes should
swing the nature of mankind Godward,
it would seem. If man by nature is so
poised between Heaven and hell a neutral
environment would keep him indecisive
forever.
^'
- 'educational philosophy of the book
is largely a reflection of the philosophv of
^hr> International Council of Religions Ed
ucation as given in Vieth's The Church
and Christian Education and Bower and
Hayward's Protestantism Faces Its Ed-
V. rational Task Together.
Harold C. Mason
Humanism As A Philosophy, hv Corliss
Lamont. New York: Philosophical
Library, 1949. 368 pages. $3.75.
This volume has the modest purpose of
establishing naturalistic Humanism as the
one accurate, appealing and universal
rallvinp- point for men of intelligence and
good will to be found in the modem world.
Here are conclusions "grounded on solid
scientific fact'-. Tp. 14S) Here is a philo
sophv which offers itself as the flowering
achievement of modem science and rea
son.
Professor Lamont brushes aside the
Academic Hi'manism of Babbitt and
More; the Catholic or Integral Human
ism of Aquinas and Maritain; the sub-
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jective variety of F. C. S. Schiller; the Re
ligious Humanism of Dietrich, Reese, Wil
son and Potter; and ignores completely
the Evangelical Humanism of Lynn
Harold Hough. The author is intent on
one thing: a world-view in which Nature
is everything, in which there is no super
natural and in which man is an integral
part of nature and not separated from it
by any sharp cleavage or discontinuity.
Thus our cosmos lacks a supernatural
and eternal God and men are without
supernatural and immortal souls. Nature
itself constitutes the sum total of reality.
Matter rather than mind is made the
foundation-stuff of the universe. Theism
degrades the intellect and implies an un
acceptable curtailment of novelty in the
world. Forced to admit, however, that men
are compelled to assume something self-
existent, Lamont makes his "faith choice"
on the side of Eternal Matter "self-
existent, self-active, self-developing, self-
enduring."
With Matter thus deified it becomes
no trick at all for the naturalistic Human
ist to decry supernatural religion as the
"brain-spun creation of the human imagina
tion" teaching a cosmology of conceit and
a superstitious anthropomorphism which
illegitimately projects the importance of
human values from this planet to existence
as a whole. Belief in a personal future life
is placed under special attack as almost
the only pragmatic value of the super
natural left to modern religion. If this is
true then Dr. Lamont is correct in as
suming that for his purposes "we can take
no more important step than to discard
the illusion of immortality."
As a result, man stands alone in a uni
verse that does not care. But even this fact
means that men should face life buoyant
ly and bravely. Nature and nature appre
ciation become a therapeutic substitute for
God. The "ever present glory of visible
nature" takes the place of the traditional
glory of the supernatural on a basis said
to be "a fair exchange, and more."
With all ethical laws and systems de
clared to be relative, the "regulative prin
ciple" of morality is found in a devotion
to the "social good." The chief end of
thought and action is the happiness and
glory of man. With "service to humanity"
as the watchword, organized society can
look forward with confidence to a sustain
ed pattern of happiness under the guidance
of sovereign reason.
Christian thinkers can benefit from this
volume in many ways. It offers an excel
lent resume of the philosophic, religious
and cultural roots of secularism. It will en
hance every christian's sense of responsi
bility and need for a vital witness in our
world of today. It should bring to a sharp
er focus the deep cleavage which exists be
tween the Gospel and the natural man.
We agree with the author that stupidity
is as great a sin as selfishness; and "the
moral obligation to be intelligent" ranks
always among the highest of duties. For
this very reason the author should be less
subjective or naive in assuming all gaps
in scientific knowledge as merely "tem
porary ignorance" which makes it possible
for a given scientific hypothesis to be
treated as if it were an established fact.
The truth that biologists have not yet dis
covered precisely how organic forms
evolved from inanimate matter is not quite
the "little thing" Lamont casually makes it
out to be. Moreover, the problem of evil is
not profoundly solved by the mere de
claration that evil is non-existent, or, at
best, a man-made something which can be
man-solved. It seems to the reviewer that
this grandson of a Methodist minister is
much indebted to the Christian Gospel,
which he is seeking so earnestly to destroy,
for noble aspirations and an optimism
which is otherwise unwarranted, than ap
pears on the surface.
Chilton C. McPheeters
The Philosophy of Existence, by Gabriel
Marcel. New York: The Philosophi
cal Library, 1949. 96 pages. $2.75.
The recent appearance of volumes on
Existentialism, both by Existentialists and
by their critics, has given the reviewers the
choice of trying to read and understand the
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primary sources themselves, or of reading
the interpretations of others who have done
so. Under review here is one of the
voliunes by a recognized exponent of the
Cafe movement in philosophy. He is the
son of a former French Minister to
Sweden, a non-practising CathoUc who
shared the conventional nineteenth-century
French agnosticism. In his youth, an aunt
who had become a protestant exerted a
profound influence upon his thought, as
did also the sudden death of his mother.
Marcel grew up in revolt against the hy
pocrisy of the France of his youth, and
against what seemed to him a sterile edu
cational system. His thought pattern be
came one of polarity; even those who
sought to surround him with every care in
creased his feeling of inner tension. Out
of this pattern of experience, he sought to
develop a metaphysics.
The volume consists of three parts, the
first entitled "On the Ontological Mystery"
being an exposition of the metaphysic of
despair which the author believes to be the
beginning of all wisdom. To him, despair
consists in the recognition of the in
adequacy of technics, the futility of hoping
in ourselves, and the abortive tendency of
all forms of self-activism. The second part,
"Existence and Human Freedom" is an ex
position of the philosophy of Jean-Paul
Sartre, with something of a criticism of
Sartre's ontology. The third part, "Testi
mony and Existentialism" is, according to
Marcel himself, a definition of "the 'exis
tentialist' doctrine which I personally
hold."
It is not easy to get a clear conception of
the meaning of such a writer as Marcel.
This is due in part to the fact that he is a
defeatist philosopher, whose philosophy is
a generalization of his personal frus
trations, plus a criticism of the culture in
which he was reared. One would get the
impression from this work that all men grew
up in a sterile environment, surrounded by
hypocrisy, and under circumstances which
could not possibly leave any meaning to hu
man life. At times, Marcel recognizes that
he is unfair to those who sought to make
his early life pleasant. At the same time, he
distils from this very experience the con
clusion that "to think, to formulate and to
judge is always to betray."
More serious still. Marcel in his preach
ment concerning freedom would liberate
man from religion, from morality, and
finally from objective truth, and leave him
a floating chip on the chaos of what was
once thought to be an orderly universe.
Those of us who believe that we still per
ceive order in the cosmos, and objective
truth in religion and morality, can scarcely
escape the feeling that this Philosophy of
Nothingness has spent too much time in the
Latin Quarter. Just as the liberalism of
a generation ago hypostatized its optimism
until it had only a bland and genial uni
verse, so today "the philosophy of despair
makes the frustrations of a selected group
of individuals the touchstone for all philo
sophy. Neither Concord nor the Mont-
martre can tell us all about human life!
The American reader will find it diffi
cult to follow Marcel in his constant in
trusion of drama into philosophy. It is true
that life presents crises and conflicts; but
must these always be tragic ? May there not
be mistaken identities, as well as hopeless
inconsistencies and paradoxes? And ought
not philosophy seek to render these con
tractions consistent, rather than leave itself
at the tender mercies of the elements of
Nothingness ?
A certain amount of criticism of Ufe is
wholesome. Perhaps the Anglo-Saxon
world has subjected itself to too little of
this. But it is strange medical practice
which can do no more than diagnose. Mar
cel does not seem to have any method for
rescuing man from the blankness which he
finds Ufe to be. Here he keeps close com
pany with Sartre. Both seem to illustrate
the futility of philosophy divorced from
religion.
Harold B. Kuhn
A Short History of Existentialism, by
Jean Wahl. New York: Philosophi
cal Library, 1949. 58 pp. $2.75.
The philosophy of existence, current
ly in vogue in France under the unof-
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fical guidance of Jean-Paul Sartre,
grows out of the feeling that there is
evident in human affairs a process of
self-destruction. American readers find it
difficult to think in terms of the general
futility which has seized the yoimger gen
eration of Europe, not only those in the
conquered lands but also those in the
nations nominally victorious. Thus some
are tempted to pass over the French Ex
istentialism as ephemeral and insignificant.
This is without doubt a too-easy dismissal
of the philosophers of the French cafes;
after all, university students of America do
not grow beards during their summer's
travel in Europe to look like people of no
consequence.
Wahl has attempted to trace the broad
Existentialist movement from its beginning
with Kierkegaard, its elaboration by Jas
pers and Heidegger, and its translation in
to the terms of the anguish of the younger
French thinkers by Sartre. In Kierkegaard,
the opposition between existence and es
sence appears to be secondary to the polari
ties felt within the experience of the exis
tent individual. The four characteristics of
the existent are well-known: his infinite
relationship with himself, his self-con
sciousness of becoming, his quality of
passionate thought, and his passion of free
dom. It is this subjective individual who
attains the high ground of affirmation of
relation to the Wholly Other in the scan-
dalization of reason. But even in his treat
ment of these paradoxes, Kierkegaard
seeks to bring existence and transcendence
toether. Wahl's thesis at this point is, that
Kierkegaard is nearer to those whom he
opposed than might be expected. His con
tribution to the philosophy of existence
was not that he was an absolute pioneer,
but that he gave form to certain aspects in
the work of Schelling, Kant and Hegel.
In the work of Jaspers and Heidegger,
Wahl sees both the secularization and the
unfolding of Kierkegaard's thought. In the
unfolding, Heidegger attacks the major is
sue, that of the problem of Being. Through
his conception of anguish, he reaches the
conclusion that we exist without any ap
parent reason for our existence; we sense
our Geworfenheit, an existence without
essence. This conclusion grows, for
Heidegger, out of his atheism - - though
as Wahl points out, he utilizes expressions
which reflect the religious ideas with
which he grew up, signifying that "some
of the essential notions in his phil
osophy arise from a certain level of
thought which he believed he had passed
beyond." (p. 25) In him, the ideas of
Nietzsche and the feelings of Kierkegaard
are continually in combat.
Wahl avoids the tendency to see Sartre
simply within the context of Heidegger's
thought. While the former is deeply indebt
ed to the latter, he also owes much to
Husserl and Marcel. The manner in which
Sartre bifurcates Being seems to Wahl to
lay the foundation for something of an
ontological leap, by which he concedes to
the ontological need, through the massive
"in-itself" that which the "for-itself"
would logically preclude. The author finds
Sartre an idealist; above the world of the
problematical, with its inevitable failures
and frustrations, stands the world of the
functional "in-itself" to which conscious
ness opposes itself as a Nothingness.
The final section of the volume is de
voted to a series of criticisms and rebut
tals by Berdyaev, Gandillac, Gurvich,
Koyre, Marcel and Levinas. These deal
largely with the relationship existing be
tween the system of Heidegger and Sartre.
Some of these critics seem to contribute
little to the general purpose of the volume,
namely that of acquainting the reader with
the contemporary revolt against the philo
sophy of essence.
Harold B. Kuhn
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